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ABSTRACT 
 
 
KIRSTIN E. WELLS. Transit riders and access to bus service: a neighborhood 
analysis. (Under the direction of DR. JEAN-CLAUDE THILL). 
 
 
 Intra-jurisdictional delivery of publicly provided services often results in 
observable differences in service levels that vary by spatial subunit 
(neighborhood).  These variations are related to the socio-demographic 
characteristics of neighborhoods and have been hypothesized in prior literature 
to be the result of bias against or favoritism towards certain neighborhoods. 
Using a mixed-method approach, this dissertation examines publicly provided 
bus service in four cities – Asheville, NC, Charlotte, NC, Mobile, AL, and 
Richmond, VA – to examine whether the socio-economic character of a 
neighborhood is related to the share of municipal bus service it receives and if 
distribution of shares is impacted by politicized decision-making in the public 
bureaucracy.  Specifically, do transit-dependent neighborhoods, or those with a 
high percentage of non-Caucasian, low-income, elderly, or student residents 
receive inferior bus service? 
 Findings confirm prior research that both professional norms and bias are 
present in service delivery decisions in all four cities.  Bias toward upper-income 
neighborhoods is found in all four cities as well as bias against non-Caucasian 
neighborhoods in two of the four cities.  Additionally, in cities with unreformed 
government structure, service delivery decisions may be politicized. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The breadth of public services provided by government at the local level 
has a material impact on day-to-day quality of life for American citizens.  Basic 
needs of safety and public health in the form of police protection, clean drinking 
water, and trash collection as well as expectations of comfort and convenience 
such as good streets and parks are all ensured by the provision of local public 
services.  Indeed citizens in America have come to expect that 911 calls will be 
answered promptly, that garbage will not be allowed to pile up, that libraries will 
be open and well-maintained, that schools will be safe places of good education, 
and that public transportation will be available at convenient times.  This oft-cited 
quote from Teitz (1968) on the importance of urban services, which is from the 
1960s, remains true and relevant today: 
Modern urban man is born in a publicly financed hospital, receives his 
education in a publicly supported school and university, spends a good 
part of his life traveling on publicly built transportation facilities, 
communicates through the post office…drinks his public water, disposes 
of his garbage through the public removal system, reads his public library 
books, picnics in public parks, is protected by his public police, fire and 
health systems…his everyday life is bound up with governmental 
decisions on these and numerous other local public services. (p. 36)  
 
 Public services fall under the broad category of public goods, which are 
characterized by non-rivalry and non-excludability in consumption and thereby 
unsuitable for provision by private markets (Pacione, 2001).  Because public 
goods such as those mentioned in the Teitz quote are often deemed critical for 
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maintaining a certain societal standard of living, government takes on the 
function of producer. Literature on public goods is abundant and focuses mainly 
on the problem of optimal output levels given that prices are not available to 
equilibrate supply and demand.  Yet beyond the economic aspect of allocation, 
public goods have a spatial aspect as well.  Public services are available to all 
residents within a jurisdiction, yet in many municipalities service levels vary by 
spatial subunit.  Within a particular city or town, some schools are better than 
others, some parks better maintained than others, police seem more responsive 
in some neighborhoods than others, and so on.  In addition, these service 
differentials often appear to be systematically associated with the socio-
demographic characteristics of neighborhood areas.  For example, schools and 
parks in inner city neighborhoods, which are more likely to have low-income and 
non-Caucasian residents, are often deemed inferior to schools in middle-class 
neighborhoods.  Even though discrimination in service provision has long been 
illegal, complaints about service quality and quantity in certain neighborhoods are 
a chronic issue in urban America.  As stated by Pacione (2001), “the nature of 
public-service provision remains a major determinant of the well-being of different 
social groups in the city” (p. 354).  
Service differentials do not arise spontaneously.  As pointed out in the 
above quote service delivery is the result of governmental decisions.  Yet elected 
officials are seldom involved in day-to-day service administration and operations.  
Instead, local governments delegate this responsibility to agents, either by 
establishing public bureaucracies or by contracting with private firms to provide 
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services on the government’s behalf (Moe, 1984).  The purpose of this 
dissertation is to examine one local government service – namely bus 
transportation – in order to probe whether service differentials are systematically 
tied to the socio-demographic spatial distribution of residents within a municipal 
jurisdiction.  The examination also includes whether certain local government 
structures are more likely create an environment where bureaucratic decision- 
making is subject to external influences from the political arena.   
Bus transportation is the topic of this dissertation primarily due to a gap in 
the public policy service delivery literature.  Prior studies in the body of research 
on intra-jurisdictional service distribution have focused mainly on services such 
as police and fire protection, libraries, sanitation, streets, and schools whereas 
few have focused on public transportation.  Results on bus transportation, or any 
city service for that matter, are not automatically generalizable to other services 
because city services tend to have separate bureaucracies.  Nonetheless, results 
on bus transportation may contribute to theoretical understanding of municipal 
service distribution.  The fundamental research question is as follows:  Is the 
socio-economic character of a neighborhood related to the share of municipal 
bus service it receives and are shares impacted by politicized decision-making in 
the public bureaucracy?  The structure of the research design is based on a 
mixed-method approach, which is a combination of quantitative statistical 
modeling and qualitative archival and elite interview research.   
This dissertation broadens the methodology for analyzing urban service 
delivery in two primary ways.  First, whereas most prior studies have used a 
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single case study, this study examines bus service in four cities in order to 
compare and contrast results.  Second, this study examines the impact of local 
government form on service delivery decisions.  Urban areas are the focus of this 
study because of relevance (the majority of Americans live in urban areas) and to 
follow prior literature, which has focused on cities.  In addition, rural areas have 
unique service distribution issues that suggest a different theoretical model than 
for urban areas.  Cities constitute the sampling frame in this study for analytical 
simplicity because counties and regional metropolitan areas are comprised of 
multiple jurisdictions and multiple service bureaucracies.  Neighborhood is the 
unit of analysis because in most American cities, neighborhoods are fairly 
homogenous units comprised of residents that share a common characteristic 
such as ethnicity, culture or economic status (Savas, 1978). Therefore, 
neighborhoods are logical units for comparing service levels by socio-economic 
characteristics.   
In certain cases public services are provided by a public authority or 
special purpose government.  Special purpose governments are government 
corporations established by state legislation with an organizational structure that 
is a mix of a private firm and a public agency (Foster, 1997).  At the same time, 
they are like private firms in that they have administrative and financial 
independence from local government and typically do not have the authority to 
levy taxes.  They are like public agencies in that they are providing public goods 
and are eligible to receive aid from federal, state, and local government sources.  
Originally, special district governments were created with the intent of separating 
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politics from administration so that public services would be provided within a 
private, business-like organizational structure (Mitchell, 1990).  Because the 
organizational structure of these entities is specialized and unique, this study 
focuses on service delivery activities of public bureaucracies administered by 
general-purpose local governments. 
The body of the dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapters 2 through 4 
discuss theories on public bureaucracies and service distribution and review 
literature that is theoretically relevant.  Chapter 5 outlines a proposed synthesis 
of existing theories into a general theory with an accompanying model.  Chapter 
6 provides justification for further study.  The research question, methodology, 
and research design are covered in Chapter 7 followed by results in Chapter 8.  
Discussion is covered in Chapter 9 and conclusions with suggestions for future 
research are discussed in the last chapter.    
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: THEORIES ON PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES 
 
    
 Given that public agencies are the focal point for this study on the 
provision of urban services, a preliminary point of inquiry is an understanding of 
how they do what they do.  In that regard, the body of literature examining public 
bureaucracies from a theoretical standpoint has considerable breadth and depth.  
One branch of this literature that is concerned primarily with the structural aspect 
of bureaucracies seeks to apply economic analysis of the private firm to public 
entities.  Called by Moe (1984) the “new economics of organization,” this theory 
uses the Coasian notion of the efficiency of contractual relationships in 
institutional organization as well as the principal-agent paradigm to explain how 
institutions are structured by hierarchy, how supervisors control the behavior of 
subordinates, and how external actors control the behavior of institutions.  Moe 
argues that the new economics of organization is not directly applicable to public 
bureaucracies because of the political environment in which they operate and the 
nonmarket-like nature of public goods, yet the framework does offer some 
theoretical insight to organizational structure and control. 
 Another branch of the study of public bureaucracies is deemed the “new 
institutionalism” (Koelble, 1995).  Scholars in this field examine the behavior of 
individuals within the bureaucracy in order to understand how institutions make 
decisions.  Within new institutionalism, separate schools of thought have 
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emerged.  Rational choice institutionalists argue that individuals within the 
bureaucracy are utility-maximizers motivated by strategic self-interest.  Self-
interested actions, then, shape the institutions in which they operate.  Douglass 
C. North (1990) is the most well-known proponent of this theory.  Historical 
institutionalists argue that individual motivations are formed by the institutions of 
which they are a part.  This view, commonly called bounded rationality or 
satisficing, is often attributed to March and Olsen (1984) whereby rationality is 
limited and individuals “behave according to a set of rules and procedures which 
define the appropriateness of their actions” (Koelble, p. 233).  When rules are not 
clear, the result is a “garbage can” approach to decision making which is random 
and based on limited information.  Finally, sociological institutionalists argue that 
individual self-interest and utility are only understood in terms of the culture and 
society in which individuals are embedded.  In other words, individuals are fully 
bounded by external factors.  Decision-making in this framework is completely 
dependent on cultural and societal norms as opposed to individual strategizing or 
satisficing behavior (Granovetter & Swedberg, 1993).    
 A third branch in the study of public bureaucracies is public administration.  
This field of study has a long history dating back to the 19th century when the 
administrative apparatus of government came into focus by the writings of 
President Woodrow Wilson.  The study of public administration has a distinctly 
normative aspect as scholars were concerned with the best way to do 
bureaucratic operations such as staffing, budgeting, and management.  The 
paradigm articulated by Wilson was one of professional public administration 
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whereby government used “science to pursue efficiency” (Kettl, 1983).   An 
essential component of the professional bureaucratic structure as outlined by 
Wilson is the separation of administration and politics.  Under this model, public 
services are provided according to standard professional norms by staff with 
technical and managerial training and expertise.  Moe (1991) summarizes this 
model well: 
A guiding principle during the formative years of public administration was 
the separation of politics and administration.  According to this notion, a 
normative one about how good government ought to work, it was the job 
of elected officials to set public policy through the political process, and 
the job of administrators to execute policy impartially and effectively – 
which was possible only in the absence of politics.  Politics, driven by 
concerns for constituency and patronage (and worse), worked against 
effective organization and had no place in the administrative process.  
Administration was, as Woodrow Wilson put it, “a field of business,” 
designed and operated according to the same principles of effective 
organization that apply in the private sector. (p. 108) 
This model of professional management gave rise to the council-manager 
or “administrative” model for city government.  The council-manager form of 
government is modeled after a private corporation with a board (council) setting 
policy that is executed by a president (city manager).  The mayor in this model is 
one council member with equal power as the others, largely with symbolic 
powers (Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004).  The city manager is a 
professional hired for their expertise in city planning.  This form of government 
dominates the municipal landscape today and is touted by municipal 
organizations such as the International City/County Management Association 
(ICMA), whose stated goal is to promote excellence in local government through 
professional management. 
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 Recognition by scholars and practitioners alike that public administration is 
not easily separated from politics opened up yet another branch of study on the 
conduct of public bureaucracies.   Svara (1998) argues that the politics-
administration dichotomy is overstated and that Wilson originally envisioned a 
cooperative role between administration and the political body, or the legislature.  
He notes that while Wilson outlined the importance of an independent 
administrator who is technically competent, Wilson also noted the importance of 
administrative discretion and accountability whereby “elected officials and 
administrators join together in the common pursuit of sound governance” Svara 
(2001b, p. 179).  This cooperative model is more realistic than the model of a 
rational-technical bureaucracy insulated from political control because it 
recognizes “reciprocal influence” between administrators and elected officials.  
Professional bureaucrats are accountable to be responsive to elected officials; 
elected officials draw on the expertise of administrators to help shape public 
policy.     
 Moe (1991) also disputes the notion of the separation of politics and 
administration but his conceptualization of the role of the public authority is more 
coercive than cooperative.   His argument is that bureaucracies are not 
institutions of mutual advantage, like private firms, but rather they are structures 
established by the “winners” of political battles to serve their own purposes which 
results in “legal coercion and redistribution” (p. 123).  Yet winners understand 
that the political environment is inherently unstable and that its hold on control of 
power is tenuous.  As a result, winners seek to insulate their bureaucratic agents 
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from contact with political enemies.  The insulation is accomplished by a 
bureaucratic design that consists of detailed procedures and decision criteria.  
These procedures and criteria, in turn, protect the bureaucracy from having to be 
responsive to demands that originate from political enemies. 
Impact of Public Bureaucracies 
 While these different theories are useful for understanding structure, 
hierarchy, decision-making, and the political environment of public 
bureaucracies, they do not address the question that is central to this study – that 
is, whether the delivery of public services is equitable.  Indeed examination of 
equity in urban service delivery as a separate field of study began in the late 
1960s and 1970s when American scholars in the field of comparative urban 
politics began to probe distributional aspects in the provision of public goods.  
These scholars argued that distributional questions are the most important 
aspect of local government services from a social welfare perspective because of 
the relationship between access to services and standard of living.  As one of the 
foundational scholars in this field, Robert Lineberry, states, “Distributional 
considerations lie at the core of what is purportedly the central concern of 
contemporary political science: ‘Who gets what, when, how’” (Lineberry & Welch, 
1974).1    
 Distributional issues necessarily raise questions of equity.  It is important 
at the outset to distinguish between equality in service levels and equity in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 “Who gets what, when, how” is the title of a 1958 book by the political scientist Harold Lasswell.   
Lasswell’s primary argument is that the influential elites (as opposed to the masses) “get the most 
of what there is to get” in the game of politics. The title of his book is referenced continually in 
public policy literature that is concerned with distributional questions.   
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service levels.  This distinction is made by several scholars within the literature 
but most clearly outlined by Rich (1979).  Equality in service delivery is when 
every neighborhood gets the same services, e.g., every neighborhood gets 
garbage picked up once per week.  Equity in service delivery takes into account 
divergent neighborhood conditions and tailors service delivery accordingly, which 
results in equal outcomes.  For example, if suburban neighborhoods generate 
more garbage because they consume and throw away more goods, they may 
require more frequent garbage collection than other neighborhoods that do not 
generate as much trash.  Service is therefore more frequent in the suburban 
neighborhoods, but every neighborhood is equally clear of garbage.  As noted by 
Rich, “the provision of equal service outputs to groups of consumers who are in 
highly unequal circumstances may produce inequitable outcomes” (p. 152).  
Conversely, unequal service delivery may result in equitable outcomes.  The 
focus of this study and the literature on which it is based is not whether 
bureaucrats give the same amount of service to each neighborhood but whether 
“who gets what” is subject to bias, favoritism, or discrimination.   
 In fact, evidence of racial discrimination in service provision was one of 
the reasons that Lineberry began his empirical inquiry of urban service 
distribution (Lineberry, 1977).  In 1971, the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in 
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw that a town could not discriminate on the basis of race 
in providing services to citizens.  In Shaw, Mississippi, parts of the town with an 
African-American majority received services that were clearly inferior to those in 
parts that had a Caucasian majority.  This case highlighted what many urban 
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political scientists believed to be true about cities, namely that the provision of 
local government services was biased in favor of Caucasian, upper income, and 
politically powerful areas of the city.  To formally test this belief, Lineberry (1975) 
proposes the underclass hypothesis and in so doing establishes the basis for 
examining municipal service delivery from an empirical perspective.2 The 
underclass hypothesis states that neighborhoods with higher percentages of 
disadvantaged citizens – whether by ethnicity, class, or lack of political power – 
receive quantitatively and qualitatively inferior services.  The underclass 
hypothesis is actually three simultaneous hypotheses deemed by Lineberry ‘race 
preference,’ ‘class preference,’ and ‘power elite’ (1975, p. 69). 
Parallel Research in Urban Geography 
 Scholars in the field of urban geography have also probed the issue of 
equity in service differentials.  The body of literature in this field has considerable 
breadth and depth and includes studies from the U.K. and Australia.  While these 
scholars have different terms for spatial inequities including “territorial justice” 
(Harvey, 1973), “locational disadvantage” (Fincher, 1999), and the “social justice 
of collective consumption” (Pacione, 2001), the body of literature in this field is 
dedicated to analysis of the social impact of public facility location decisions.  
Typically urban geographers approach facility location questions from the 
perspective of efficiency and cost minimization.  Harvey (1973) and others that 
followed argued that because public goods have a direct impact on quality of life 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
 Lineberry’s research on service delivery is pivotal in the sense that he formalized inquiry on the 
provision of public goods into a hypothesis that would be repeatedly tested in subsequent studies.  
His study is by no means the first on this topic.  For a review of literature prior to Lineberry, see 
Burnett (1981).  Burnett deems this literature “evaluation of urban outcomes.” 
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and social conditions, the location of public services should be approached not 
only with efficiency in mind but from the perspective of distributional justice as 
well.   The urban geography perspective is summarized neatly in this diagram by 
Jones & Kirby (1982):   
 Social policy ! spatial pattern ! social outcomes (p. 301). 
 Equity has several aspects that may be used as guiding principles in order 
to achieve distributional justice in service location.  These include: equal inputs, 
equal satisfaction of demand (Savas, 1978); distribution based on need (Boyne & 
Powell, 1991); equal opportunity, compensatory equity, market equity (Crompton 
& Lamb, 1983); and procedural fairness and rights (Hay, 1995).  A full discussion 
of these concepts is beyond the scope of this research; however, the contribution 
of these scholars in urging evaluation of “current socio-spatial distributions 
against an ethically defined norm” (Pacione, 2001, p. 365) is directly relevant and 
parallel to the work of scholars in urban political science who were examining the 
underclass hypothesis.  
 A study by Currie, Enright, Hoey, and Paterson (2003) on the 
transportation disadvantaged population in rural Australia is a good example of a 
geospatial study of service delivery.  Currie et al. devise a measure of need for 
public transit that includes adults without cars, persons over 60 years, and 
students and then map the spatial distribution of need by census area against the 
coverage of the transportation network.  Currie et al. find that areas most in need 
of public transportation have relatively poor access to it.  Another example of a 
geospatial study is analysis of park equity in Los Angeles by Loukaitou-Sideris 
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and Stieglitz (2002).  The authors map inner city and suburban Los Angeles 
parks against measured need for open space and find that while parks are 
uniformly distributed in the area, supply in relation to need shows persistent 
inequity.3        
 Scholarship in urban service delivery by political scientists and 
geographers is plainly complementary.  Burnett (1981) notes that research in 
these two fields is adisciplinary in that both are ultimately concerned with who 
gets what, why, when and where.4  The underclass hypothesis could be 
examined from a political science or geography approach, the difference being a 
matter of perspective.  For example, a geographer would examine spatial 
patterns in service delivery whereas a political scientist would use regression 
models to examine causality in service delivery.  Another distinction noted by 
Burnett is that the political science literature heavily emphasizes the interplay 
between elected officials and the professional public bureaucracy in service 
delivery decisions.5   
 The approach to answering who gets what is also slightly different in these 
two fields of study.  In general, the political science literature seeks to determine 
if levels of disadvantage vary by spatial subunit within a city and asks whether 
service distribution among those units is equitable according to the underclass 
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3
 For a comprehensive review of literature on territorial justice from the 1970s and 1980s, see 
Boyne & Powell (1991). 
4
 In his literature review, Burnett (1981), a geographer, gives a friendly chide at political scientists 
who, “for all the statistical sophistication of their analysis do not treat us to so much as a map of 
the neighborhoods in their respective studies” (p. 215). 
5
 While much of the literature from urban geography on spatial equity does not focus on 
bureaucratic decisions, Hodgart (1978) mentions the importance of class and political bargaining 
on the allocation of service benefits.  
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hypothesis.  The urban geography literature also seeks to determine if levels of 
disadvantage vary by spatial subunit within a city and asks whether service 
distribution patterns contribute to spatial disadvantage.  In other words, 
geographers assume levels of “people poverty,” or economic differences, within 
spatial subunits and examine “place poverty,” or whether the distribution of public 
goods compounds the benefits or disadvantages of certain locations (Kirby, 
1982).  The difference in approach is subtle. 
 This dissertation is focused on the role of the public bureaucracy in 
service delivery and is based on a test of the underclass hypothesis using 
statistical methods.  For this reason this research is more closely aligned and 
relies primarily, though not exclusively, on the body of political science literature. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE UNDERCLASS HYPOTHESIS AND BUREAUCRATIC 
DECISION-RULES HYPOTHESIS 
 
  
 To test the underclass hypothesis, Lineberry (1975) examines the delivery 
of municipal services in San Antonio, Texas, which at the time of his study was 
the eleventh largest city in the U.S.  His project is to analyze the relationship 
between ethnic, economic, and political characteristics and the level of services 
in each neighborhood.  Lineberry chooses two services, fire protection and park 
services, and calculates distances to these facilities for each census tract in the 
City as a measure of neighborhood service access.  He calculates Pearson 
correlations between facility distance and variables capturing the ethnic make-up, 
economic class, and electoral power in each census tract.  Based on these 
correlations he finds no evidence to support the hypothesis that disadvantaged 
areas receive poorer services.  His results hold even after controlling for park 
quality.  He concludes that different service levels in different neighborhoods “can 
best be described as unpatterned inequality” (p. 79) rather than discriminatory.  
This phrase unpatterned inequality is subsequently used as a term of art in the  
urban service delivery literature to indicate that neighborhood service differentials 
are random and not systematically related to the spatial distribution of residential 
grouping by income, race, or political power. 
In his book Equality and Urban Policy (1977) Lineberry outlines a counter 
hypothesis on urban service delivery called bureaucratic decision-rules.  Under 
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this hypothesis, the “crucial determinants of the allocation of municipal services” 
are the decisions of public bureaucrats that operate under a set of professional 
and administrative rules and procedures (p. 146).  In his theory on the “public 
Santa Claus” as he likes to call municipalities, the missing link in understanding 
how services are provided are decision-rules, or a deterministic set of 
administrative behaviors that are routine, predictable, stable, and incremental.   
“Decision-rules result from some rough admixture of professional norms, rules 
and regulations or superordinate bodies, loose perceptions of both need and 
demands” and are the “minutiae of public administration” (p. 153). 6 The 
bureaucratic decision-rule and underclass hypotheses are accepted as the two 
primary theories on urban service delivery within political science literature.    
 Another foundational work in urban service delivery that renders the same 
conclusion as Lineberry’s work is a study by Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky 
(1974 ) on elementary schools, streets, and libraries in Oakland, California.  Levy 
et al. examine various government outputs such as per pupil expenditures, miles 
of street construction, and per branch library expenditures and then analyze 
those outputs by the ethnic and economic make-ups of neighborhoods.  The 
authors identify three patterns that emerge from the findings: “the more the 
more,” or heavy service usage determines who gets more services; 
“compensation,” or the poorest areas get more services; and “resultants,” or 
distribution is more the result of unintended consequences of decisions than 
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 Lineberry acknowledges that bureaucratic decision-rules are more of a truism than a 
hypothesis; however, he argues that it is necessary to shift service delivery analysis from a 
sociospatial perspective to an institutional perspective.  
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“conscious policy choices” (p. 224).   Levy et al. conclude that all of these 
patterns are the result of actions taken by public bureaucracies, whose staff deal 
with the pressures of the public service environment by “devising operational 
procedures” that help with uncertainty in decision making.  Further, they “adopt 
formal rules and procedures that embody professional standards” (p. 228) to help 
make decisions regarding service delivery.    
Lineberry and Levy et al. establish the foundation for several studies that 
test the underclass and bureaucratic decision-rule hypotheses.  The first batch of 
these studies all find evidence to reject the underclass hypothesis.  In 
chronological order: Mladenka and Hill (1977) examine parks and library services 
in Houston; Antunes and Plumlee (1977) examine street quality in Houston 
(1977); Mladenka (1978) examines library services and parks in Virginia;  
Mladenka and Hill (1978) examine police service in Houston; Jones, Greenberg, 
Kaufman and Drew (1978) examine environmental enforcement, sanitation, and 
parks in Detroit; Coulter (1980 ) examines police service in Tuscaloosa; and 
Mladenka (1980) examines parks and fire protection services in Chicago.  The 
methodology in each of these studies with the exception of Jones et al. (1978) 
and Coulter (1980) is either correlation analysis or comparative analysis.  Jones 
et al. (1978) use regression analysis and Coulter (1980) devises a “coefficient of 
inequality.”7  Each of these studies fails to find evidence that the spatial 
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 The coefficient of inequality is designed to measure the difference between the amount of 
service delivered to an area and the amount of service that should have been delivered given an 
appropriate equity standard.  An example of an equity standard is population, thus the coefficient 
would calculate service per-capita in each neighborhood as well as service discrepancies.  This 
coefficient is not used in subsequent studies. 
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distribution of services within a metropolitan area corresponds with the spatial 
distribution of certain demographic or electoral characteristics in a patterned way. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE UNDERCLASS HYPOTHESIS REVISITED: LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
 
 A series of studies in the 1980s and 1990s challenges prior studies on 
methodological and theoretical grounds.  In terms of method, these studies 
question the use of correlation analysis as an appropriate way to examine the 
existence of bias in service provision.  In addition, these studies include a 
variable to test the bureaucratic decision-rules hypothesis, which in prior studies 
had either been examined qualitatively or not tested.  In terms of theory, certain 
of the studies introduce the need to consider environmental factors such as 
population mobility and facilities mobility in service delivery analysis and the need 
to distinguish among types of services.  Overall, the 1980s/1990s studies 
enhance the knowledge base of urban service delivery and also find evidence to 
support the underclass hypothesis. 
 As discussed above, bureaucratic decision-rules was one of the two 
prevailing hypotheses on urban service delivery following Lineberry (1975) and 
Levy et al. (1974).  While acknowledging that prior work had largely accepted the 
decision-rule hypothesis, Jones (1981) argues that politics enters into the service 
distribution process when political groups seek to manipulate rules to achieve 
desired outcomes.  On the theory that organized groups may influence service 
decisions as intermediaries between residents and public bureaucracies, Jones 
studies the impact on service distribution of two types of groups – party agencies 
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and community groups – in neighborhoods where these groups are particularly 
strong.  Jones examines the City of Chicago Department of Buildings, which at 
the time was responsible for building code enforcement.  He tests the impact of 
group intermediation at three levels of the service process – citizen complaint, 
actions taken (outputs), and impact (resolution).  Party agency strength is 
operationalized by a “deliverability index” that measures voter turnout and the 
number of votes for the winning and losing candidate in each ward.  Community 
group strength is determined by surveys of groups who are involved with the 
code enforcement process.   Using regression analysis to control for 
neighborhood conditions and characteristics, Jones finds that the strength of 
ward organizations impacts code enforcement at each level.  Community groups, 
by contrast, have no impact.  By using regression analysis to control for 
neighborhood conditions, Jones improves on prior methodology and finds that 
citizen political activism can influence service distribution “independently of the 
system of standard agency operating procedures” (p. 698).8 
 Cingranelli (1981) finds that political factors, business interests, and ethnic 
composition influence police and fire expenditures in Boston neighborhoods.  
Cingranelli’s study improves upon prior work in two important ways.  First, he 
uses a path model to test direct and indirect effects of neighborhood 
characteristics on service delivery.  Second, he includes a variable of 
neighborhood service need to test the hypothesis that service allocations are 
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 In a subsequent theoretical piece Jones (1984) deems this service distribution process “political 
ecology” whereby formal administrative policies are altered by the “on-going interchanges 
between legislatures, bureaucracies, interest groups, interested individuals, and political parties” 
(p. 372).  
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made on the basis of standard rules followed by professional administrators.9  He 
measures need for police and fire by crime and fire rates, population density, the 
percent of land that is commercial, and the percent of occupied housing that is 
built prior to 1939.  If the decision-rule hypothesis is correct, these variables 
would explain the variance in police and fire resources by neighborhood.  
Cingranelli finds that need is clearly important in explaining police and fire 
expenditures; however, the story is more complex than need alone.  For 
example, ethnicity has a significant negative direct relationship to police 
expenditures, indicating that African-American neighborhoods receive fewer 
police resources than comparable Caucasian neighborhoods.  Yet when the 
impact of ethnicity on expenditures is considered indirectly through political 
support, ethnicity has a positive relationship to police expenditures because at 
the time African-American neighborhoods were highly supportive of the mayor 
Kevin White and were the recipients of political favoritism.  Cingranelli concludes 
that “it is difficult to select a single variable…which best explains the allocation of 
service expenditures” (p. 688).   His study is an important contribution because 
he uses a path regression model to capture complex direct and indirect 
relationships in service delivery.         
 Boyle and Jacobs (1982) expand service delivery research further by 
increasing the number of services analyzed and introducing a new explanation 
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 The presence of administrative decision-making is measured by need on the theory that if 
service decisions are made on the basis of rational-technical standards, need would be an 
obvious criterion used by bureaucrats to allocate services.  Although administrators typically use 
multiple criteria to develop standard allocation procedures, need is a comprehensive measure 
that captures multiple facets such as the level of citizen complaints, usage, facility age, and the 
like.  In studies that follow Cingranelli, need is used as a standard measure to test the decision 
rule-hypothesis.     
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for service distribution called the contributory hypothesis.  Under this hypothesis, 
services are distributed in favor of neighborhoods that generate higher tax 
revenue than others.  By selecting New York City as their case study, the authors 
are able to examine several different services rather than just one or two as in 
prior studies because at the time New York City provided a broad array of 
services directly (as opposed to being provided by different levels of government 
as in other cities).  Using regression analysis with service expenditures as the 
dependent variable and socio-economic characteristics and tax contributions per 
capita as the explanatory variables, Boyle and Jacobs find that ethnicity and 
income do not impact service levels (they do not test for political factors).  They 
do find, however, that need and tax revenues impact service distribution based 
on the type of service.  Human services such as health and welfare are 
distributed based on need while property-based services such as police, fire, and 
sanitation are distributed according to the contributory theory.  
 Bolotin and Cingranelli (1983) also expand prior research by refining the 
definition of neighborhood.  The authors argue that by not distinguishing between 
residential and commercial neighborhoods, previous studies are biased in that 
service needs are not comparable in residential and commercial neighborhoods.  
To illustrate their argument, the authors examine police expenditures in Boston 
neighborhoods.  Using regression analysis, the authors estimate coefficients for 
residential and commercial neighborhoods separately and combined.  They find 
that when neighborhoods are measured on a combined basis, services appear to 
be distributed based on need.  Yet for residential neighborhoods alone, they find 
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that need declines in strength as a determinant of spending whereas electoral 
clout, measured as neighborhoods that voted for the mayor, increases as a 
determinant. 
 The four studies discussed above revisit the underclass hypothesis and 
find that while certain services may be distributed in systematic ways based on 
need, rejecting the underclass hypothesis in favor of bureaucratic decision-rules 
is premature.   Elements of underclass bias – in particular ethnicity and political 
power – impact service delivery as well.  These findings are important to the 
body of literature on urban service delivery because they introduce the idea that 
service delivery decisions are complex and can be impacted by multiple 
dynamics.    
 Koehler and Wrightson (1987) further refine the theory on urban service 
delivery by examining the role of environmental factors.  In a comprehensive 
multi-decade study on the Chicago parks, the authors not only replicate the 
original Mladenka (1980) study and re-do it using regression analysis but they 
control for environmental variables such as neighborhood population 
heterogeneity, population mobility, and facilities mobility.  The authors find that 
politics, measured by neighborhoods that helped re-elect the existing mayoral 
machine, does explain service distributions in neighborhoods where the 
conditions are more “favorable” to political influence.  Favorable neighborhoods 
are those with mobile services such as police protection, which can be more 
easily manipulated than immobile services like swimming pools.  In addition, 
favorable neighborhoods are those with more homogeneous populations where 
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“friends and enemies” are more easily identified (p. 93). Overall, like Jones 
(1981), Cingranelli (1981), Boyle and Jacobs (1982), and Bolotin and Cingranelli 
(1983), Koehler and Wrightson find both politics and standard administration at 
work in service distribution.  Yet they also add to the literature by demonstrating 
that service delivery, “whether politically or bureaucratically grounded, is limited 
by environmental conditions” (p. 95).   
 In a critique of Koehler and Wrightson (1987) as well as his own prior 
work, Mladenka (1989) publishes the first longitudinal study of service delivery in 
Chicago covering a 22 year period.  The longitudinal design is an answer to 
criticism that prior studies using cross-sectional design fail to address “whether a 
pattern of service distribution had changed significantly over time, or the extent to 
which such change favored some groups and neighborhoods and deprived 
others” (p. 562).   A second critique that Mladenka seeks to address is that prior 
research does not use a “multi-indicator approach” for measuring services.  For 
example, Koehler and Wrightson examine immobile services in their Chicago 
study.  Yet Mladenka argues that in order to uncover the political nature of 
service distribution, mobile services as well as expenditures should be included 
in the analysis.  His research design in this piece is an important enhancement to 
the literature because he picks up where Koehler and Wrightson left off in 
articulating a more complex analysis of resource distribution.  For example as 
demonstrated by Koehler and Wrightson, analysis of access to immobile services 
is highly subject to population shifts, a result which Mladenka confirms in his 
study as well – as Caucasian families moved out of the City over time, African-
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American access to parks improved dramatically.  Yet population mobility is only 
part of the story.  Mobile services, to which funds are more easily shifted by 
political whim, as well as expenditures, which are an indicator of governmental 
intent, need to be included in analysis in order to round out the service delivery 
story. 
 Overall, Mladenka (1989) finds that ethnicity declines in importance in 
explaining distributional patterns for both immobile and mobile services (the 
mobile service he studies is recreational programs).  This finding is not surprising 
given the shift from discriminatory politics in the 1960s toward an emphasis on 
equal access to services in the 1970s and beyond.  For expenditures, he finds no 
consistent predictor of variation.  The most consistent finding from this study is 
that as race declines in explanatory importance over time, the level of home 
ownership in a neighborhood rises as a consistent predictor of who gets what 
services.  Based on interviews with public officials, Mladenka concludes that 
home ownership is tied to a sense of community strength and that stronger 
communities are more likely to make demands regarding service levels.  Public 
officials, in turn, are more likely to heed community demands in order to maintain 
“stability of middle- and upper-class neighborhoods” (p. 580) as a form of self-
preservation.  This finding is interesting because it reinforces the Jones (1981) 
article on the ability of intermediary groups to put pressure on the bureaucracy.     
 Miranda and Tunyavong (1994) also argue that service type has a bearing 
on whether distribution is subject political factors.  Whereas Mladenka (1989) 
distinguishes between mobile and immobile services, Miranda and Tunyavong 
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distinguish among collective goods (police and fire), private goods provided by a 
third-party (vehicle towing, refuse collection), common pool resources (parks), 
and toll goods (transportation, utilities).  Their theory is that the nature of the 
public good determines whether distribution may be unequal.   For example, with 
toll goods such as public transit inequality in usage is more a function of ability-
to-pay (due to user fees) than distributional bias.  On the other hand, the 
determination of bus routes in a city may be highly politicized.  In addition, the 
authors argue that excludability makes private goods are more susceptible to 
political distribution whereas joint consumption makes collective goods more 
difficult to parse out based on political favoritism. Common pool resources are 
also difficult to politicize due to immobility (the Koehler & Wrightson argument).   
 To test their theory, the authors examine allocations under several 
mayoral administrations in Chicago of federally-funded Community Development 
Block Grants (CDBG) and a locally-funded capital improvement plan (CIP).  The 
authors choose these services because they are nonroutine and may provide 
mayors “with a considerable degree of latitude to influence the targeting of 
benefits” (p. 518).  Miranda and Tunyavong argue that if the distribution of 
CDBGs and CIPs, which are similar to private goods, is not politically motivated, 
it is unlikely that collective or common pool goods would be either.  Using 
regression analysis with allocations per ward as the dependent variable and 
controlling for neighborhood need, the authors find that electoral support for the 
mayor as well as aldermanic support for the mayor influence service distributions 
under certain mayors whose terms were characterized by “machine-style” 
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politics.  Their study is unique in that it raises the idea that the nature of 
governance may impact service distribution.   
 Tests of the underclass and bureaucratic decision-rules hypotheses are 
enhanced in the late 1990s with methodological techniques using geographic 
information systems (GIS).  GIS allows mapping and analysis of the spatial 
distribution of public facilities overlaid with spatial grouping of socio-economic 
characteristics.  For example, Talen (1997) uses GIS to detect patterns in the 
spatial distribution of parks in Pueblo, Colorado, and Macon, Georgia.  At the 
census block level (a more refined unit of measurement than census tracts as 
used in previous studies), Talen investigates whether poor and ethnic 
neighborhoods have better or worse access to parks than wealthy white 
neighborhoods by using visual “equity mapping.”10 These equity maps compare 
demographically-defined neighborhoods with the location of parks.  Talen finds 
that park access in Macon is clustered around low-income, non-white 
neighborhoods while park access in Pueblo favors higher-income areas.  
Although the equity map technique is a more precise method for measuring 
geographic access to immobile services than correlation analysis, Talen’s model 
does not control for need.  Thus in her study, no explanation is given for why 
poorer, low-income neighborhoods have better park access parks in Macon or 
why higher-income neighborhoods have better park access in Pueblo.          
 Table 1 summarizes the political science urban service delivery literature 
after Lineberry/Levy et al. 
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 Talen notes that the equity maps are a form of exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA), which 
is a family of techniques used to summarize and detect spatial characteristics of data.   
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Table 1: Underclass Hypothesis Revisited 
Author(s)/Year City Services Method Findings 
Mladenka  & Hill 
(1977) 
Houston Parks/libraries Correlation Distributional 
decisions are made 
on the basis of 
decision rules  
Antunes & Plumlee 
(1977) 
Houston Streets T-test  Race and income do 
not account for street 
roughness 
Mladenka (1978) Several 
cities in 
Virginia 
Libraries/parks Correlation Black and poor 
neighborhoods are 
not disadvantaged 
Jones, Greenberg, 
Kaufman & Drew 
(1978) 
Detroit Environmental 
enforcement, 
sanitation, parks 
Regression Distribution is 
according to service 
rules 
Mladenka & Hill 
(1978) 
Houston Police response 
time 
Correlation Services are 
distributed in 
response to need 
Coulter (1980) Tuscaloosa Police Coefficient of 
inequity 
No evidence for 
systematic 
discrimination 
Mladenka (1980) Chicago Parks, fire, refuse 
collection, education 
Correlation Ecology impacts 
distribution 
Jones (1981) Chicago Building Code Regression Political party groups 
influence 
bureaucracy 
Cingranelli (1981) Boston Police, fire Path analysis Politics, business 
elite, and race impact 
service distribution 
Boyle/Jacobs 
(1982) 
New York Health, welfare, 
education, police, 
fire, sanitation 
Regression Human services 
distributed based on 
need; property 
services distributed 
based on per-capita 
tax revenue 
Bolotin/Cingranelli 
(1983) 
Boston Police Regression Mayoral support 
influences 
distribution 
Koehler & 
Wrightson (1987) 
Chicago Parks Regression Environmental 
factors impact the 
extent to which 
politics plays a role in 
distribution 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Author(s)/Year City Services Method Findings 
Mladenka (1989) Chicago Parks, recreational 
programs 
Regression Over time, race 
declines as a 
predictor of 
distribution while 
home ownership 
increases in 
importance 
Miranda & 
Tunyavong (1994) 
Chicago Capital Improvement 
Plan (CIP) 
Regression Electoral support and 
regime maintenance 
influence distribution 
Talen (1997) Pueblo, 
Colorado & 
Macon, 
Georgia 
Parks Exploratory 
Spatial Data 
Analysis 
Socio-spatial service 
distribution is 
patterned 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL THEORY ON URBAN SERVICE DELIVERY 
 
 
In summary, the literature on urban service delivery to date implies that 
who gets what with regard to public services is a function of both professional 
decision-rules as well as underlying actions that deviate from rules and 
procedures, which results in patterned inequality in certain services.  Except in 
the case of political manipulation, which is essentially a trading-votes-for-service 
dynamic, or outright racial discrimination, the literature is not explicit about 
sources of patterned inequality.  In other words, what causes poor or non-
Caucasian neighborhoods to receive fewer public resources or upper income 
neighborhoods to receive more public resources, all else equal?  At some point 
in the service distribution process, public agencies make decisions that result in 
patterned inequality.  What factors contribute to these decisions?  Several 
explanations originate from the political science and public administration 
literature that help frame a general theory on urban service delivery.  The general 
theory is not new; rather, it is an attempt to synthesize ideas on service delivery 
from the extant literature.  The theory is more comprehensive than the prevailing 
underclass and bureaucratic decision-rules hypotheses because it considers the 
context within which service delivery decisions are made.      
Political Pressure  
 Clearly, as pointed out by Moe (1991) and others, public agencies do not 
operate in an insulated independent environment like a private firm.  Agencies 
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operate in an inherently political arena and may be subject to pressure from 
elected officials.  For example, an elected official who receives complaints from 
constituents about a particular service may approach the agency in charge of the 
service and request a deviation from standard allocations.  In the extreme case 
where politicians have strong influence over the decisions of service agencies, 
this dynamic amounts to trading votes for services.  Yet a more likely scenario is 
that public bureaucracies are constantly bombarded with requests and 
complaints about service levels in certain neighborhoods and then must decide if 
or how to respond to those complaints.  The extent to which the bureaucracy is 
under political control depends on several factors including form of government in 
the jurisdiction (mayor-council versus council-manger) (Svara, 1999) and what 
the public agency believes are its responsibilities with regard to responding to 
outside influence (Greene, 1982).  These two factors are discussed below.   
 The literature on government form and reformed political structures 
indicates that public agencies may be more influenced by elected officials under 
the mayor-council form of government than under the council-manager form.  
Svara (1999) argues that separation of powers between the mayor and council in 
a mayor-council form gives the mayor extensive control over policy, 
administration, and staff.  As a result, mayors can “tap organizational resources 
or utilize executive powers to advance their political ends.”  An example of this 
type of mayoral power is “cutting the budget for services in the districts of council 
members who oppose the mayor” (p. 147).  Svara also points out that in mayor-
council cities, competing policy goals between the mayor and council often 
!
!
##!
results in gridlock.  In this scenario, the bureaucracy can “play the mayor and 
council off each other” and take on unique power of its own.  Thus in a mayor-
council form, the bureaucracy is more likely to be subject to manipulation or to 
exercise discretion.  By contrast, in the council-manager form of government, the 
council has unitary power over the mayor and the bureaucracy.  The council 
appoints a city manager who is accountable to the council and the office of 
mayor is largely ceremonial.   In this form, bureaucratic manipulation and 
discretion are more limited.    
 The structure of city council elections might also impact the extent to 
which elected officials can pressure the bureaucracy.  MacManus (1999) notes 
that when council members are elected by district rather than at-large, the 
constituency base for council members is district-based rather than city-wide.  As 
a result, the potential for “ward style” politics is greater with district elections.  
Additionally, MacManus points out that districts can sometimes be drawn based 
on certain racial or ethnic groupings of residents.  A community unified by racial 
or ethnic bonds may be more likely to organize and make demands for service to 
a “captive” council member than a heterogeneous community with varied 
demands for service.      
 Besides form of government and the structure of council elections, 
bureaucrats’ perception of job duty might impact the ability of elected officials to 
influence service outcomes.  In a study of municipal administrators in New 
Jersey, Greene (1982) finds that receptivity is related primarily to how 
administrators understand their role.  Greene examines two conceptualizations of 
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the “organizational man” borrowed from Harmon (1974): the professional 
technocrat and the politico-administrator.  The former sees their job as the 
routine application of objective rules (similar to Lineberry/Levy) whereas the latter 
sees their job as involving compromise with citizens and elected officials.  
Professional technocrats are less responsive to demands from both citizens and 
officials because they believe bowing to external requests hinders the 
effectiveness of the agency.  By contrast, politico administrators see their role as 
part of a larger political process and are more likely to try and respond to the 
concerns of elected officials and citizens.  Greene finds that the majority of 
bureaucrats (75%) fall into the professional technocratic category.  This finding is 
consistent with the summary of the literature above that most public service is 
delivered via standard procedures but with deviations from procedure in 
particular situations. 
 Although administrative receptivity is a part of the general theory on urban 
service delivery, it is not tested in this study on bus service.  Testing for 
bureaucratic receptivity would involve collecting data directly from public 
administrators, which although it would be highly desirable data to round out the 
theory, is beyond the scope of this study.  Instead a test for the impact of political 
pressure on bus service delivery is based on readily available data on 
government form and council election structure that indirectly capture the 
potential effect of the public bureaucracy.       
Pressure from Community or Neighborhood Groups 
 In a dynamic that operates similarly to political pressure on the 
bureaucracy, advocacy by community and neighborhood groups might impact 
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service levels.  This pressure may take the form of direct contact from a 
community group to the bureaucracy or indirect contact through an elected 
official.  In either case, as noted by Jones (1981), “intermediary 
organizations…maybe able to take advantage of bureaucratic procedures to 
secure benefits, or even change the rules or alter their impact “ (p. 688).  It is 
important to note here that some bureaucratic decision rules allow for requests 
from constituents to be a factor in determining service allocations.  Many transit 
agencies have a citizen advisory committee that gains public input on service 
changes and they may also hold public meetings to gather input on proposed 
service changes.  These activities would be considered part of standard decision-
rules.  But where this type of community input is not the case, bowing to pressure 
from a community group would be considered a deviation from standard 
professional procedures.   
 A typical American city has an assortment of neighborhood and 
community groups, some more active than others.  Often the interests of 
neighborhood groups are property-related, for example mobilizing against 
gentrification or commercial development.  In other cases groups mobilize to 
reduce drug dealing or other kinds of crime.  In still other cases and of import to 
this study on bus service, groups mobilize to improve municipal services (Mesch 
& Schwirian, 1996).  The ability of community groups to impact service decisions 
depends on several factors.  Mesch and Schwirian find that effectiveness 
depends on socio-economic status and organizational complexity.  They examine 
a sample of neighborhood groups in Columbus, Ohio and the ability of these 
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groups to influence policy makers in conflicts over land use.  Effectiveness is 
measured both in terms of process and outcomes.  The authors find that higher 
socioeconomic status of a neighborhood is associated with more effective 
collective action, but not because residents of these neighborhoods are 
necessarily more active than residents in poorer neighborhoods.  This finding 
suggests an elitist bias in favor of upper-income neighborhoods on the part of city 
officials.  In addition, the authors find that the more resources that associations 
can mobilize from its members, such as newsletter publication and meeting 
attendance, the more effective the collective action.  This result is not surprising 
and suggests that any neighborhood, whether low- or upper-income, could 
effectively lobby for services if they are well organized.  Mesch and Schwirian 
analyze neighborhood racial composition as well and found that race did not 
impact the effectiveness of group action.     
Berry, Portney, and Thomson (1993) arrive at similar conclusions in their 
in-depth five-city study on citizen participation in policy-making.   Like Mesch and 
Schwirian (1996) they find that socioeconomic status is positively correlated with 
neighborhood group activity yet unlike Mesch and Schwirian this relationship is 
because residents in higher income neighborhoods are more active.  This result 
holds true regardless of organizational complexity.  They also conclude that the 
participation structure established by a city positively impacts citizen involvement.  
In other words, if city officials have a process for gathering input from community 
groups, citizen participation increases.  Yet even in cities with good participation 
structures, Berry et al. find that the ability of community groups to impact the 
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“agenda building process” within a city is limited.   Thus the presence of active 
community groups does not mean that these groups are able to secure the 
benefits they desire.  This conclusion is similar to that of Jones (1981), discussed 
above, who found that party organizations were able to influence service 
outcomes but community groups were not.  When all of these dynamics on 
neighborhood action are considered with respect to bus service, we may expect 
to find that upper income neighborhoods receive disproportionately better bus 
services than others but not necessarily as a result of active community groups in 
these neighborhoods.   
Impact of Rules 
Political pressure or pressure from neighborhood groups may cause a 
public agency to deviate from established service delivery rules, resulting in a 
pattern of service distribution that varies according to the social or racial 
characteristics of a neighborhood.  Yet it is also possible that service distribution 
variations arise not because of the underlying actions of public bureaucrats but 
directly as a result of established service delivery rules.  Rules that appear fair, 
neutral, and predictable may end up having an unintended distributional impact 
whereby one neighborhood is favored over another.   
It is critical from a theoretical standpoint to distinguish between intended 
and unintended distributional impacts.  As discussed in Chapter 2, because of 
differences in neighborhood conditions, equitable decision rules would result in 
some neighborhoods receiving more or less service than others.  For example, 
high-crime neighborhoods would be expected to receive more police patrols than 
low-crime neighborhood.  Similarly neighborhoods where a high proportion of 
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residents have no cars would be expected to receive more bus service than 
neighborhoods where most people have cars.   Because high-crime and low-car 
neighborhoods are often poor and non-Caucasian neighborhoods, rules that 
distribute resources according to need would have the intended consequence of 
less police and bus service in upper-income Caucasian neighborhoods.  What is 
of more interest from an outcome perspective is where seemingly fair rules have 
unintended consequences that result in patterned inequality.   
The literature in Table 1 has several examples where standard rules lead 
to non-neutral distributive outcomes.  For example in Oakland, California, Levy et 
al. (1974) found that certain rules favored high-income neighborhoods (i.e., “the 
more the more”).  Because rules for teacher transfers allowed teachers with more 
seniority to request a certain school, experienced teachers requested upper-
income schools because they were perceived to be easier to teach in.  The result 
was that more experienced teachers, who also had higher degree attainment 
because they received advanced degrees while on the job, taught in white upper-
income schools.  In another example, Mladenka and Hill (1977) found that in 
Houston library resources were allocated based on circulation rates.  Since 
circulation rates were higher in branch libraries located in higher income 
neighborhoods, this seemingly fair and neutral rule resulted in less library 
resources for low-income neighborhoods.     
Jones, Greenberg, Kaufman and Drew (1978) also note the distributional 
impact of service rules in their study of Detroit sanitation service.  They 
discovered two decision rules in place for service delivery; first, allocate 
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resources according to the amount of garbage generated, and second, allocate 
more resources to the center city.  The first rule was implemented for operational 
efficiency with the intended effect of equality in neighborhood sanitation 
conditions even though some neighborhoods would receive more sanitation 
resources.  Yet analysis by Jones et al. found that the amount of garbage was 
positively correlated with income, thus the unintended result was higher income 
neighborhoods receiving more sanitation resources.  The second rule was also 
implemented for operational efficiency because center city neighborhoods have 
more alleys, which make garbage collection more difficult than “front pick-up.”  
Because the center city was populated with poorer residents, the second rule 
had the unintended result of benefitting poor neighborhoods disproportionately.     
These examples indicate that an analysis of bus service delivery rules is 
an important component in understanding bus service distributions.    
Discretionary Behavior 
 When decision-rules are vague, loosely worded, open to interpretation, 
serve as guidelines, or only define minimum levels of service, the door is opened 
for individuals within a public agency to exercise discretion in service allocation.  
The body of literature on bureaucratic discretion is rich and offers several 
explanations for the behavior of individuals within a public bureaucracy.  When 
discretionary behavior comes into play, outcomes of bias or favoritism in service 
delivery are more likely.   
 Theories on bureaucratic behavior are best understood on a theoretical 
continuum.  As discussed in the Introduction, the new economics of organization, 
which is based on Coasian transaction cost theory, assumes that bureaucrats 
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are rational, utility-maximizing public employees that arrange themselves in 
contractual relationships based on authority to accomplish the mission of the 
organization in the most efficient way (Moe, 1984).  Behavioral theories such as 
those based on the work by Herbert Simon (1947) are founded on the 
importance of going beyond neo-classical assumptions of individual rationality to 
understand how “people actually think.”  Simon introduced the concept of 
bounded rationality and satisficing behavior whereby individuals in an 
organization cope with the overwhelming complexities of the organizational 
mission by following simplified routines.  As a result, organizational output may 
not be efficient.  Also in the behavioral tradition, March and Olsen (1984) argue 
that individuals within an organization do not necessarily seek to maximize their 
utility but rather seek to follow rules and behaviors that have been established by 
the organization as appropriate.  In cases where established rules are not clear, 
individuals “dip into a garbage can of possible solutions” that emerge from habit 
or routine (Koelble, 1995).  These behavioral theorists lay the foundation for 
understanding discretion in bureaucratic decision-making.   
 Another framework of bureaucratic behavior that builds on prior theory but 
adds more depth to the understanding of how individuals in public agencies do 
what they do is principal-agent theory (Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971).  Based on 
neo-classical economic theory, the principal-agent model characterizes 
organizations as agents that carry out the mission of principals (elected officials) 
to whom they are contractually bound.  Within the organization is another layer of 
principal-agent relationships with supervisors as principals and workers as 
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agents.  This structure creates certain incentives for each party based on 
information asymmetry.  The principal has an incentive to ensure that the agents 
carry out the work that the principal is responsible for and the agents have an 
incentive to carry out the wishes of the principal only if it is their best interest.  In 
this model, the agents are rational utility maximizers whose main motive is to 
maximize nonwork, which results in “shirking.”  Principals in turn control shirking 
by different forms of monitoring.  Although the principal-agent model is not 
directly applicable to public bureaucracies because there is no “residual” or 
pecuniary reward with which to control agent behavior such as in a private firm, 
Moe (1984) argues that this model is applicable to public bureaucracies because 
its focus on hierarchical control “captures the essence of organizational 
relationships and offers a coherent framework for integrating both the 
bureaucratic and the political dimensions of administrative performance” (p. 772). 
 Brehm and Gates (1999) offer a more fully developed model of 
bureaucratic behavior using the principal-agent framework that they call the 
“enhanced principal-agent model.”  Their main premise is that “bureaucratic 
accountability depends most of all on the preferences of individual bureaucrats” 
(p. 2). Their model hinges on expanding the utility function of bureaucratic 
workers to allow for the utility of work to vary across tasks according to 
preference for a particular project.  Therefore this model allows that agents may 
actually like the work they do and want to see policies succeed.  Their behavior 
choice is expanded from just working versus shirking to working, leisure-shirking 
(traditional shirking), dissent-shirking (because of opposition to a project), and 
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sabotage (negative output).  This expanded model also has implications for 
principal or supervisory control of workers because the motives of workers are 
more complex.  Brehm and Gates find that while pecuniary rewards still matter 
for bureaucrats, the most efficient means to encourage work is to give workers 
projects that give them a sense of accomplishment and feeling that they have 
done a good job.  By including a range of possible behaviors, the Brehm and 
Gates framework offers a robust and thorough description of what happens 
inside bureaucracies.   
 The focus of the theories discussed above is an understanding of behavior 
inside public bureaucracies.  Another branch of this literature focuses on the 
behavior of street-level bureaucrats, or bureaucrats whose work involves direct 
contact with citizens.  Lipsky (1980) outlines the most influential theory on the 
behavior of street-level public workers.  Lipsky argues that bureaucrats respond 
to the pressures of their work environment – namely inadequate resources, 
challenges to their authority, and ambiguous job expectations – by creating 
simplifying routines and mechanisms to help them get through their tasks and 
minimize stress.  The structure of these routines is informed by the stereotypes 
and biases of the bureaucrats.  Thus a student who is perceived as brighter and 
less hostile may receive more attention from a teacher than a student who is 
perceived as difficult.  Or a suspect who is perceived as aggressive may be 
treated more harshly by police than a suspect who is perceived as compliant.  
Inevitably, race and class stereotypes influence perceptions.  The result is 
inequitable service delivery that is defensible according to the bureaucrat but 
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biased in the eyes of the citizen.  Lipsky argues that the result of these dynamics 
in street-level bureaucracy is that workers may be incapable of providing better 
service to some clients. 
 Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) describe the street-level dynamic in 
different terms than Lipsky.  They argue that conflict between two different 
narratives – the “stage-agent” whereby bureaucrats seek to apply laws and 
regulations, and “citizen-agent” whereby bureaucrats make judgments about the 
moral character of the people they are serving – interact to describe why street-
level workers do what they do.  The result is that some citizens receive 
discretionary treatment from “risk-taking street-level workers,” others receive 
what the rules allow, and “still others are excluded from help or…maligned and 
abused” by street-level workers (p. 5).  In this model of behavior, discretion is a 
powerful tool that can impact social order for the better or for the worse.    
 Taken as a whole, theories on bureaucratic behavior are useful for 
understanding why staff within a public agency may exercise discretion in service 
allocations.  It is not difficult to envision that faced with the complexities of 
deciding where to put bus stops and routes, staff may fall back on habits and 
routines to get around rules or even shirk the rules if they did not believe rules 
were justifiable.  And although bureaucrats that make decisions on bus service 
are typically not street-level workers, similar dynamics may operate for bus 
agency staff.  Staff may make judgments about residents in particular 
neighborhoods and whether or not they were worthy of the bus service that rules 
require.   
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 Even if bureaucrats generally follow standard procedures due to a sense 
of doing was is right for the organization (March & Olsen, 1984) or because they 
have a preference for doing a good job on a project that they believe in (Brehm & 
Gates, 1999), it seems likely that they could also be influenced by subtle biases.  
Stone (1980) argues that the predispositions of public officials cause them to 
favor “upper-strata interests” in service delivery decisions.  In Stone’s theory, 
society is stratified according to power and influence and this stratification results 
in systemic power of the upper-strata because of their economic position in 
society.  Public officials are cognizant of this power and are thus predisposed to 
favor the upper-strata even if the favoritism is “unplanned and unforeseen” (p. 
979).  Stone argues that presumed unpatterned inequality of urban services does 
not make sense in light of a “higher level of dissatisfaction with service delivery 
among lower-income and minority groups” (p. 986).  Stone, however, does not 
offer evidence of either predispositions on the part of bureaucrats or 
dissatisfaction on the part of residents.   
 Overall, the literature on bureaucratic behavior suggests that discretion is 
a key element in understanding the allocation of public resources.  Bureaucratic 
discretion is difficult to measure without gathering data directly from individuals 
making service decisions.  Gathering this data is beyond the scope of this study; 
however, if data used in this study find a pattern of inequality in bus service, 
further research on bureaucratic behavior will be required.   
Type of Service 
 Finally, the type of public service impacts the degree to which delivery 
rules can be manipulated.   Jones & Kaufman (1974) suggest that social services 
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such as education, police, and health may be more prone to political control 
because these services are more subject to “demand-making” by citizens.   In 
other words because issues with social services are more frequently the target of 
community concern, they are more likely to be subject to public accountability 
and thereby political involvement.  Yet in a study of New York City, Boyle and 
Jacobs (1982) found the opposite result – that social services were distributed 
according to economic need whereas resources for “property-related” services 
such as police, fire, and sanitation were distributed according to who paid higher 
taxes.  (This contrast is due in part to differing definitions of police protection as a 
social service or a property-related service). 
 Jones et al. (1978) also argue that fixed facilities are less susceptible to 
political manipulation than mobile facilities because they are the least amenable 
to change in a short time period.  Cingranelli (1981) makes this argument as well 
with respect to police and fire services in Boston, where his model had higher 
explained variance for police than fire services due to “greater short-term 
manipulability of neighborhood police allocations” (p. 676).  A quote from his 
study summarizes this point well: “Fire protection is a capital-intensive service 
function, relying on immobile facilities spatially disbursed within a community.  
Police services, on the other hand, are mobile, labor intensive, and would be 
expected to be more responsive to short-term administrative, political, or 
economic influences…”(p. 676).  In their study of Chicago parks, Koehler and 
Wrightson (1987) also find that neighborhoods with park facilities that are less 
susceptible to short-term redeployment (e.g., outdoor facilities such as swimming 
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pools) are less subject to political favoritism in distribution than more mobile park 
facilities (e.g., indoor programs such as art and music).   
 Besides fixed versus mobile facilities, Baer (1985) states that it is 
important to distinguish between labor- and capital-intensive public services 
because the decision-making process differs for these two types of services.  For 
example, labor-intensive services, such as police patrols and garbage collection, 
are routine and repetitive with decision-making that is short-term and easily 
revisable.  By contrast, capital-intensive services, such as new baseball fields or 
transit lines, require long-term budgeting and planning with decision-making that 
is not easily reversible.  Baer argues that because capital-intensive services are 
often subject to public approval, bureaucrats may be forced to “provide well-
articulated and publicized justifications of distributive decisions” (p. 891).   
Decision-making for labor-intensive services, on the other hand, is more behind 
the scenes in the bureaucracy.   
 As discussed above, Miranda and Tunyavong (1994) argue that a 
distinction must be made among collective goods, private goods provided by a 
third-party, common pool resources, and toll goods in the analysis of urban 
service delivery.  With regard to bus service they argue that the toll good aspect 
may mitigate distributional bias while on the other hand the labor-intensive 
determination of bus routes may invite distributional bias.  Overall, bus service, or 
the provision of bus routes and stops, is a mobile, labor-intensive service.  (The 
capital-intensive portion of bus service, which is the purchase of new equipment 
and new transit lines, is not the subject of this study).  To the extent that bus 
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service provides for the mobility needs of urban residents, it could be considered 
a social service as well.  Thus we would expect that bus service might be more 
susceptible to rule manipulation.   
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Theoretical Model 
 The preceding discussion suggests a theory of service distribution that is 
depicted by the chart shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Model of Service Distribution  
 
  The core of the model is the public agency or bureaucracy that is charged 
with providing a public good.  The public agency translates budgetary allocations 
into service outputs, which are then distributed geographically throughout the 
metropolitan jurisdiction.  Service distribution takes two forms: patterned 
inequality, where geographic distribution across the jurisdiction is skewed to 
certain areas because of political pressure, neighborhood group pressure, 
discretionary behavior on the part of staff in the public agency, the rules 
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themselves, or the type of service; or unpatterned inequality, where geographic 
distribution across the jurisdiction results in service level differences devoid of 
such systematic relationships.  This model provides the basis for the research 
design and analysis in this dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: JUSTIFICATION FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 
 
 Given the theory established above, the next step is to test the theory on a 
particular service or services within a metropolitan jurisdiction or multiple 
jurisdictions.  This study focuses on public transportation and bus service in 
particular.  Although the literature on equity in public transportation is broad (as 
discussed below), few studies specifically test the underclass hypothesis and bus 
service.  Grengs (2001), using a GIS-based method similar to Talen (1997), 
measures neighborhood access to grocery stores in Syracuse, New York via 
public transportation.  Grengs finds that African-American and low-income 
residents likely find it more difficult to reach grocery stores than other residents.  
Like Talen, his model does not control for neighborhood need.  Miranda and 
Tunyavong (1994) discuss transportation theoretically as a toll good but do not 
empirically analyze transportation in their Chicago study.11 Currie et al. (2003) 
use a needs-gap method to demonstrate that access to transportation in rural 
Australia is inequitable.  Yet their study focuses on whether the transport system 
was designed to meet community needs.  Thus a test of the theory on urban 
service delivery and public transportation on a neighborhood basis would be a 
contribution to the literature.   
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 Miranda and Tunyavong argue that inequality in the distribution of a public good depends on 
the type of good.  Types of public goods are collective goods, (police), private goods (parking 
meters), common-pool resources (parks) and toll goods (museums, transportation).  They argue 
that toll goods may be less subject to unfair distribution access depends first on ability to pay.  On 
the other hand, bus route placement may be a highly politicized activity.  
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 Public transportation is an opportune service to study for two primary 
reasons.  First, public transportation is vital to the economic and social well being 
of urban areas from a public policy perspective.  The American Public 
Transportation Association (APTA) (2008a) reports that almost 60 percent of 
transit rides are for commuting to work.  Given the economic and environmental 
costs of automobile congestion in urban areas, public transit provides a 
necessary and viable option for mitigating the side effects of car-based 
commuting.  Public transit has become even more important in light of the recent 
rise of gas prices.  In 2008 when fuel prices rose above $3.00 per gallon, transit 
systems across America reported increases in ridership, which corresponded 
with a decrease in car vehicle miles traveled.  The response of transit use to gas 
prices indicates that where transit is available, users are able to transition fairly 
quickly from cars to transit with the associated benefits of cost savings and 
reduced road congestion.  The transition from cars to transit held even when gas 
prices fell in the later half of 2008.  The APTA reports that in 2008 transit 
ridership was the highest that it had been in 52 years, with increases on all 
modes of transit (APTA, 2009).  Increased ridership suggests that users 
switching from cars to transit for cost reasons have found transit a suitable 
alternative to cars.   
 Public transit also provides mobility for those without access to private 
transportation.  Eleven percent of transit trips are for going to school and nine 
percent for shopping and medical visits (APTA, 2008a).  For some urban 
residents, the availability of transit can mean the difference between being able 
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to access schools, stores, or the doctor or not.  The Federal Highway 
Administration (2002) reports in a transit rider survey that 21 percent of riders 
had no other means of reaching their destination (including walking) without 
public transit.  As noted by Murray (2001), “the ability to maintain one’s network 
of family and friends is vital to perceptions of quality of life since transportation 
provides the means for this interaction” (p. 177). 
 A series of studies conducted in various Australian areas highlight the link 
between social exclusion and mobility.  As summarized by Dodson, Buchanan, 
Gleeson and Sipe (2006), these studies find a relationship between low socio-
economic status and transit-poor areas of Melbourne (Morris, 1981, Cheal, 2003, 
Dodson, 2004) and Sydney (Battellino, 1997).  In addition, Dodson et al. (2007) 
find that connectivity between residential areas and employment centers via 
public transit in Gold Coast City is low for more disadvantaged residents.  The 
main project of these studies is to demonstrate that lack of mobility compounds 
social disadvantage because without access to transit, poorer residents cannot 
access employment and other services needed to improve their economic status.    
  Second, bus transportation is a service that has been the target of 
criticism for patterned inequality.  Several transit agencies across America have 
been subject to complaints for discrimination against minority riders in terms of 
the quantity and quality of service provided including Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, Boston, St Louis, and Chicago (Pucher, 1982).  Common complaints 
are insufficient service provided to inner city areas, particularly from inner city 
areas to suburban job areas, and more crowded, less dependable, and slower 
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service in inner city areas.  Because in many metropolitan areas the majority of 
inner city riders are non-Caucasian residents, complaints about transit service 
have in some cases been filed as violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, which prohibits discrimination against minority groups in federally funded 
projects (Pucher, 1982).  Los Angeles is the most prominent example of a Title VI 
legal action.  In 1996 the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. filed a 
class action lawsuit against the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority claiming that the system operated separate and unequal bus and rail 
systems.  The plaintiffs, which included the Bus Riders Union and the Korean 
Immigrant Workers Advocates, claimed that inner city buses were more crowded 
and that proposed fare hikes, which were being levied to fund light rail systems, 
were unfair.  The plaintiffs won the suit.  As a result, fares were not increased 
and more buses were put on inner city routes (Environmental Defense Fund, 
2008). 
 Equity issues in bus service have been raised not only with regard to the 
quality and quantity of service but with regard to finance practices that result in 
unfair inter-modal and intra-modal subsidization.12  Across transit modes, almost 
every public transit system in the U.S. receives government subsidies in order to 
help cover costs.  The subsidies match 50 percent of operating costs and 80 
percent of the net cost of new capital projects.  Garrett and Taylor (1999) argue 
that due to ridership patterns these subsidies have a social equity impact.  Inner 
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 A useful summary of transit equity evaluation research is found in Iseki, H. and Taylor, B. D. 
(2001). The Demographics of Public Transit Subsidies: A Case Study of Los Angeles. Presented 
at the 81
st
 Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board. Washington, D.C., January 
2002. 
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city residents who are typically low-income and non-Caucasian tend to rely more 
on bus and subway whereas suburban residents who are typically higher-income 
and Caucasian rely on express bus and rail transit.  Due to federal subsidy rules 
that favor new capital investments over operating expenses as well as the 
political reality of voters who tend to favor commuter rail projects over less-
appealing bus transit, subsidy dollars are more likely to go towards new capital-
intensive commuter and light rail lines.  Thus subsidy dollars are skewed in favor 
of upper-income riders.  Li and Wachs (2004) confirm this argument in a study of 
San Francisco’s Geary Corridor transit line.  They find that the preferred light rail 
alternative for improving the corridor would generate the most financial support 
from the federal government even though an alternative that would have 
upgraded the existing bus system would have been more efficient from a cost 
perspective.       
 Subsidy variations exist within bus service as well.  Because most transit 
systems charge a flat rate per trip, short trips are more profitable to a transit 
system than long trips (Pucher, 1982).  Because inner city low-income and non-
Caucasian riders tend to travel shorter distances than suburban commuters, 
inner city riders effectively subsidize commuters.  A study by Iseki and Taylor 
(2001) of transit riders in Los Angeles confirms this argument.  Iseki and Taylor 
calculate subsidy per passenger trip, which is essentially cost minus fare 
revenue, and find that subsides for express bus service used by higher-income 
commuters have a higher subsidy than local short-trip bus service.  Martinelli and 
Medellin (2007) report similar results in a study of bus service in Columbus, Ohio.  
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Using fare per mile and travel time per mile as measures of equity instead of 
subsidy per trip, Martinelli and Medellin find that fares per mile were lower for 
longer-distance trips and travel time per mile was shorter as well.  They conclude 
that “not only do privileged groups appear to pay less per mile, but they also 
appear to receive a better quality service in terms of speed…” (p. 36).            
 Inequities in the quality of transit service and transit subsidies are 
symptoms of a larger dilemma in public transit – that is, the problem of conflicting 
goals.  Public transit receives federal funding both to serve the mobility needs of 
all residents within a metropolitan area as well as to reduce road congestion and 
poor air quality by taking cars off the roads (APTA, 2008b).  The conflict arises 
because meeting these two goals necessarily entails questions of resource 
allocation between two different types of transit markets: transit-dependent or 
captive riders and choice riders.  Transit-dependent riders typically encompass a 
certain demographic segment of the population, namely senior citizens, students, 
and those who cannot afford to buy and maintain a car.  The latter tend to be 
segregated into certain neighborhoods within a metropolitan area and are highly 
correlated with low-income and non-Caucasian neighborhoods.  By contrast, 
choice riders use transit primarily for commuting and tend to be segregated in 
more middle- and upper-class neighborhoods.  Therefore resource allocation has 
equity implications.   
 The issues with transit service quality and subsidies discussed above 
suggest that resources may be tilted in favor of choice riders.  Grengs (2004) 
argues that the goal of reducing congestion actually undermines the goal of 
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universal mobility because enticing choice riders to switch to transit requires 
offering the type of service that is attractive to them, namely, expensive rail lines 
with comfortable stations and coaches.  Thus scarce resources are diverted from 
bus lines to rail lines or from inner city bus service to suburban bus service.  With 
regard to bus service, the perception in many urban areas across America is that 
suburban transit routes receive more transit resources, whether it is more 
frequent service that runs on time or express bus routes on comfortable, newer 
buses.  Inner city transit is perceived as more run down, with older buses that are 
crowded and do not run on time.  Whether or not the perception is true is the 
focus of this study; however, the suburban-city tension in transit service is a 
perpetual issue.    
 The suburban-city tension in transit is closely related to another public 
policy issue – spatial mismatch.  Spatial mismatch, or the separation of job 
seekers from available jobs, is the result of a decades long trend of job 
suburbanization.  Cheaper land in the suburbs and access to major highways in 
suburban locations has changed the economics of locating plants and offices in 
cities, thereby opportunities for employment in the inner cities has decreased.  
The impact of job suburbanization is felt on the low-skilled labor force, who tend 
to reside in lower-income inner city neighborhoods and who are thereby more 
likely to rely on public transportation to get to work.   As more jobs for which inner 
city residents are qualified move to suburban zones in a metropolitan area, the 
need increases for transportation from the city to suburban employment centers.  
As reported by Wachs and Taylor (1998), “Though not necessarily a problem for 
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workers who have reliable cars, employment suburbanization can dramatically 
reduce job opportunities for those who depend on traditional, fixed-route, public 
transit to reach the increasingly far-flung job sites.  In a study of low-skilled 
commuters in ten American cities, for example, Taylor and Ong (1995) found that 
dependence on public transit reduced employment access far more than did any 
other factor analyzed, including residential location” (p. 16).  
  The transportation element of spatial mismatch is particularly relevant in 
the context of welfare reform legislation in 1996, which requires welfare 
recipients to work after a certain time period.  As discussed above, employment 
opportunities for these workers are often located in suburbs and require reliable 
transportation from city to suburban areas.  Yet recent investments in public 
transit have been directed to rail transit, which does not serve the needs of inner 
city riders.  Giuliano (2005) reports that between 1984 and 2000, the supply of 
transit service in the U.S. increased 38%, with a 25% increase for bus service, 
61% for commuter rail, 37% for heavy rail, and 214% for light rail.  The emphasis 
on rail service is to attract riders who travel from suburban areas to white-collar 
downtown jobs.  By contrast, investments in reverse-commute transit that would 
benefit inner city job seekers has lagged (Wachs & Taylor, 1998).   Thus 
inequities in public transit are germane to broader social issues of urban poverty 
and equality of opportunity.  The following quote from Sanchez, Upton, Jones 
and Lucas (2007) summarizes well the importance of studying the distribution of 
bus resources in urban areas: 
The process of transportation planning and decision-making allocates 
social and economic opportunity.  Because the allocation of public service 
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benefits and costs are distributed in space and influence the location 
patterns of both social and economic classes, the examination of spatial 
patterns of these benefits has inherent equity implications (p. 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
  
 The history of inequities in service quality, subsidies, and investments 
between inner city and suburban transit service as well as prior literature on 
underclass bias in service delivery and the extent to which public bureaucracy is 
professional raises the following research question: is the transit-dependent 
character of a neighborhood related to the share of municipal bus service it 
receives and are shares impacted by politicized decision-making in the public 
bureaucracy?  Transit-dependent neighborhoods are defined as those with lower 
incomes and a higher percentage of non-Caucasian residents.  Neighborhoods 
with a high percentage of students or elderly residents may be considered 
transit-dependent as well (Pucher, 1982).  In addition, with the exception of 
elderly neighborhoods, transit-dependency may typically be associated with a 
lack of political clout.  Thus the definition of transit-dependent is broader than the 
Lineberry definition of underclass neighborhoods.  Anecdotally, the hypothesis 
that transit-dependent or underclass neighborhoods receive inferior bus service 
seems fairly plausible given observed differences in bus quality and complaints 
from riders in these neighborhoods that their service is not as good as say, 
service on express routes from suburbs to cities.  The hypothesis also seems 
fairly plausible from the standpoint of economic theory because captive riders 
have inelastic demand for bus service and thus would be more willing to tolerate 
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fare increases, crowded buses, and poorly-maintained bus stops because they 
simply do not have a choice.  The null hypotheses generated from the primary 
research question are that:  
(1) neighborhood income has no relationship to bus service;  
(2) neighborhoods with high percentages of non-Caucasian, elderly, and student 
residents have no relationship to bus service; and  
(3) politicized decision making has no relationship to bus service.     
 As noted in the literature, the other hypothesis on service delivery is that 
distributions are made according to bureaucratic decision-rules without 
systematic bias.  If this hypothesis is correct, we would expect to find that service 
distributions are related to a standard criterion such as need.  The project of the 
quantitative portion of this dissertation, therefore, is measuring the availability 
and quality of bus service and explaining the variance in bus service on a 
neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis.   
Unit of Analysis 
 The research design is based on neighborhood as the unit of analysis.  
Neighborhood is the most appropriate unit of analysis because in America, 
neighborhoods in metropolitan areas have almost in all cases developed as 
segregated socio-economic units due to the phenomenon of decentralization.  
Decentralization, also known as suburbanization, began in the post World War II 
era and continues to the present day in many American metropolitan areas.  
Decentralization is essentially the result of the pursuit of better quality of life away 
from densely populated cities to areas with more space.  For the most part this 
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pursuit is available to those with the means to buy land outside of the city and 
cars needed to commute, namely middle- and upper-income residents. Dreier, 
Mollenkopf and Swanstrom (2001) describe the phenomenon in class terms: 
“The separation of the rich from the poor is a long-standing tradition in American 
society…Moving up the economic ladder has also meant moving away from the 
dust, grime, immigrants, and poor people crowded into the cities to high-status, 
sylvan suburbs” (p. 31). 
 Empirical evidence on decentralization is well documented.  For example, 
Berube (2006a) analyzes demographic shifts between large cities and their 
suburbs using 1990 Census data.  Berube found that for the 100 largest U.S. 
cities, decentralization was the dominant population trend between 1980 and 
1990 – these cities grew half as fast as their suburbs and growth in the top 80 of 
100 cities was outpaced by growth in the suburbs.  These patterns held for cities 
all across the country, suggesting what Berube calls “common metropolitan 
destiny” (p. 40).  The suburbanization trend is dominant even though several 
cities have experienced population growth in core urban areas in the form of 
“downtown rebound” (Sohmer & Lang, 2006).  
 Suburbanization has an ethnic context as well as an economic context 
whereby low-income city residents are predominantly ethnic minorities.  Berube 
(2006b) finds that between 1990 and 2000, population in the 100 largest cities in 
the U.S. shifted from white to “majority minority.”  Growth in Hispanic and Asian 
immigration to cities added to the existing African-American population of cities, 
which was already high (24.7 percent in 1990).  Non-Caucasian populations are 
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highly correlated with lower-income populations.  As reported by Downs (1994), 
median household income in 1990 was 38 percent higher in the suburbs than in 
the central cities.  In metro areas with population greater than 1 million, the 
difference was 45 percent.   
 Not only do inner cities have greater percentages of minority and low-
income residents, these populations tend to be concentrated.  For example, 
Glaeser and Vigdor (2006) measure the extent of African-American segregation 
between 1990 and 2000 and find that, although segregation is at its lowest point 
since the 1920s, the average index of dissimilarity for African-American residents 
in metropolitan areas is 0.65, which is generally interpreted as 
“hypersegregation” on a scale between zero and one.  Logan (2006) confirms 
these findings and reports that in addition, African-Americans tend to live in more 
segregated neighborhood than Hispanics and Asians. 
 Beyond socio-economic differences, city and suburban neighborhoods 
have certain distinct ecological characteristics.  Suburban neighborhoods are 
characterized by low-density land use where newer homes are constructed on 
more acreage.  Suburban retail areas are more dispersed and connected to 
residential areas by arterial roads.  Mobility is exclusively based on private 
automobile although some residents choose to use public transit for commuting.  
By contrast, city neighborhoods are characterized by high-density land use, older 
construction, and multi-family housing units.  Mobility in these neighborhoods is 
typically more pedestrian or transit-oriented.  
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 Because neighborhoods in most cities represent discrete areas containing 
residents with shared socio-economic and ecological characteristics, the 
neighborhood is a valid unit of analysis for examining intra-jurisdictional 
differences in service delivery.   Indeed, the research question is only interesting 
and relevant because of the socio-economic structure of American 
neighborhoods – if neighborhoods contained a mix of residents, possible bias in 
service delivery would not be a public policy issue. 
In this study, the concept of neighborhood is captured by the census tract.  
While a few studies in the body of urban service delivery literature have used 
other units of analysis such as traffic analysis zones or census blocks, most have 
used census tracts.  This choice is logical given the definition of census tract.  
The Census Bureau defines tracts as “small, relatively permanent geographic 
entities within counties…to be as homogeneous as possible with respect to 
population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions” (U.S. Census 
Bureau,  2008, p. 10-1).  Clearly social scientists would argue that the 
neighborhood is a concept with varying definitions.  As discussed by Martin 
(2003), neighborhood could be a literal place-based definition such as dwellings 
within close proximity that have similar characteristics and market values.  Or it 
could be a social-based definition such as the area around a certain church or 
school.  Or it could be defined by political ward boundaries.  Yet a generally 
accepted conceptualization of neighborhood is a sub-unit within a metropolitan 
jurisdiction where housing characteristics, people, and culture are similar.  
Although census tract does not explicitly consider cultural homogeneity, the 
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Census definition of census tract fits fairly well with the generally accepted 
conceptualization of neighborhood.  It is also a convenient operational unit of 
analysis as all Census data are released at this level of geography, and data by 
many other federal, state, or local agencies are published at this resolution. 
Given the unit of analysis, the second step in the research design is to 
select a sample of neighborhoods for analysis.  One way would be to select a 
random sample of individual neighborhoods across the country in cities that have 
public bus service.  Although a random sample is in many cases a desirable 
approach, for this study the amount of data gathering from hundreds of bus 
systems around the country (in order to have a sufficient sample size) that would 
be required to execute a randomized design is not feasible.  Therefore a 
purposive nonrandom sample of neighborhoods is a second best approach.  The 
issue with a nonrandom sample, of course, is that neighborhood non-
comparability creates selection bias.  For example, in each city in America the 
political climate, level of activism, history of the bus system, governance of the 
bus system, attitudes toward transit, climate, geography, and demographic 
characteristics differ.  These differences would confound the analysis of variation 
in bus service if a subset of neighborhoods were selected from selected 
metropolitan areas.  A more valid approach would be to select all neighborhoods 
from a particular jurisdiction so that area characteristics and bus system 
characteristics are the same for each neighborhood.  This design approach is in 
fact dictated by the general theory on urban service delivery.  The theory states 
that form of government, strength of neighborhood organizations, type of service, 
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staff discretion, and rules impact how services are delivered to neighborhoods.  
These variables only make sense within the context of a certain jurisdiction 
because they are unique for each jurisdiction.  Therefore comparison within 
jurisdictions is more valid than comparison across jurisdictions.  
 All of the studies listed in Table 1 with the exception of Talen (1997) 
examine neighborhoods within a single city.  The authors do not provide 
justification for selection of a particular city – presumably they were selected 
based on research convenience.  This dissertation seeks to improve on prior 
literature by explicitly specifying a method of selecting cities for analysis.   
Design 
 To answer the research question, a single-city case is sufficient as long as 
the method for analyzing variance in neighborhood bus service is valid and 
reliable.  Yet the results from a single-city case may not be as useful from a 
theoretical standpoint as a multi-city case.  Yin (2003) argues that single case 
studies are useful when the case represents either a critical, unique, or revelatory 
case or a representative, typical case.  The theory on urban service delivery is 
more concerned with discovering patterns in service delivery than explaining 
unique or representative cases.   As a result, Yin argues that replication logic 
calls for a multi-city case study.  A single-city study may “uncover a significant 
finding,” however the “immediate research goal would be to replicate this finding 
by conducting a second, third” and more cases (p. 47).   A multi-case design 
improves upon past studies that, while adding to theoretical understanding, do 
not allow for detection of systematic patterns across cities in the delivery of the 
same service.   
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 In addition to a multi-case research design, Yin argues that a robust study 
would include at least four cases – two cases from two subgroups, or a “two-tail” 
design.  The subgroups are deliberately chosen based on a key characteristic 
driven by theory that differentiates the two groups.  The two cases within each 
group have similar characteristics to capture  “literal” replication.  The two distinct 
subgroups capture “theoretical” replication whereby the results from the first 
subgroup may contrast from the results of the first subgroup but for predictable 
reasons based on theory.  Of course a larger sample of cities – ten to 20 – would 
be desirable in order to increase the number of observations.  Time limitations on 
data collection and analysis dictate no more than four cities for this study on bus 
service.   
Following a two-tail design, the four cities in this study are broken into two 
subgroups and deliberately chosen on the basis of the form of government in the 
city.  Form of government is the basis for selection because it is one of the key 
components of the general theory on urban service delivery (as shown in Figure 
1).  The theory states that political pressure is one reason that a public agency 
would deviate from standard procedures in making service allocations.  Prior 
studies testing the underclass hypothesis have measured political pressure on a 
neighborhood basis, usually by measuring support for the mayor or voter turnout 
by neighborhood.  Yet in reformed (council-manager) structures, mayoral support 
is not necessarily a valid proxy for the political clout of a neighborhood because 
mayors have less power to influence a public agency than in non-reformed 
(mayor-council) structures.  Furthermore, high voter turnout in a neighborhood 
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does not necessarily mean that the neighborhood will be otherwise politically 
active.  Thus finding a valid measure for political clout by neighborhood is 
problematic.  Instead, I introduce the concept of political pressure into the model 
on a city basis instead of a neighborhood basis by using government form as a 
key point of comparison among cities.  This design allows for a test of the theory 
on the impact of government form on service distribution patterns.  
The first step in a multi-city approach requires selecting a purposive 
sample of cities with bus service.  City is the appropriate geographical unit for 
this study as opposed to metropolitan area because the theory on service 
delivery is focused on intra-jurisdictional rather than inter-jurisdictional service 
decisions.  The political dynamics and public bureaucracies of various 
municipalities within a larger metropolitan area differ even though they may be 
geographically proximate.  Analyzing neighborhoods across jurisdictions in a 
metropolitan area would thereby introduce the issue of non-comparability.  This 
point is important especially in light of bus service, which unlike other services 
that are provided along jurisdictional boundaries such as police protection, tends 
to be provided in multiple jurisdictions across a metro area, often on a regional 
basis.  Yet the focus of analysis is neighborhood differences in service delivery, 
not regional differences.  Therefore the geographical area of study must be 
limited to a single jurisdiction.    
Sample Selection 
  The population from which the sample is drawn is all U.S. cities with 
public transit service.  The sampling frame is data published in the American 
Public Transportation Association 2008 Public Transportation Factbook (APTA, 
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2008a).  These data rank transit agencies by mode and by various categories 
including by passenger trips, revenue vehicle miles, and vehicles available at 
maximum service.  Because passenger trips is a common statistic used in public 
transportation, I worked from the list ranking bus systems by passenger trips to 
select cities and systems for comparison.13  The APTA data list 490 bus systems 
in total (the data are based on primary data from the Federal Transit 
Administration’s National Transit Database).  The top 24 systems have greater 
than 50 million annual passenger trips.  The next 50 systems have between 10 
million and 50 million annual passenger trips, 205 have between 1 and 10 million 
trips, and the remaining 211 have less than 1 million trips.     
The first criterion I used to select cities for analysis is that bus is the only 
form of public transit in the city.  The intent of selecting cities with bus service 
only is to reflect cities where the only true choice for travel besides car (and bike 
and walking, which constitute a very small percent of travel) is bus service.  As 
such, access to bus service is highly relevant for those without cars or those with 
cars who choose to use public transportation. That criterion excludes 23 of the 
top 24 systems.  The second criterion is that the bus system is operated by a 
local government (city, county) as opposed to a special purpose government 
(public authority).  This criterion is critical because the theory on urban service 
delivery outlined above applies to government bureaucracies and not public 
authorities, which are corporate-like in structure and are insulated from the 
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 Trips are reported on an “unlinked” basis, which means that each boarding is counted as a 
separate trip.  Thus a trip from a point of origin to a destination that requires a transfer(s) is 
counted as multiple trips.  Passenger data is commonly reported as unlinked due to the ease in 
data collection. 
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political process.  This criterion eliminates several cities as the majority of bus 
systems are operated by public authorities.    
The third criterion is that the city has demographic characteristics that 
allow for a test of underclass bias.  This criterion has two components – the city 
must have a sufficiently large African-American population and a very low 
Hispanic population.  The reason for these components is twofold.  First, African- 
Americans are heavy users of bus transit in general and also use transit more 
heavily than Hispanics.14  Second, African-Americans tend to live in more 
segregated neighborhoods than Hispanics, which facilitates testing of underclass 
bias by neighborhood.15  Thus using cities with African-Americans as the 
dominant ethnic group keeps the samples comparable.  This criterion eliminates 
many cities in the West, Southwest, and Midwest.  Fourthly, the transit system 
must be of a certain minimum size in order to have a sufficient number of bus 
routes for analysis.  This criterion eliminates 211 cities with systems registering 
fewer than 1 million annual passenger trips.   
Finally, the system must not be located in a city that is dominated by a 
college or university because bus routes that cater to universities do not reflect 
typical urban residential areas.  For example, Tallahassee, Florida has 25 city 
bus routes, nine of which serve two large universities, Florida State University 
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 In a study based on data from the 1995 Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey, Pucher, 
Evans & Wenger (1998) find that African-Americans make more than 10 times as high a 
percentage of their travel trips by bus than Caucasians and almost three times as high a 
percentage as Hispanics.  In a more recent report issued by APTA on rider profiles (APTA, 2007), 
the ATPA found 35.7% of roadway transit riders are Black/African American and 13.7% are 
Hispanic/Latino. 
15
 Using 2000 Census data, Logan (2006) finds that African-Americans are much more 
segregated from Caucasians than are Hispanics or Asians.  
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and Florida A&M University.  Students are counted as residents by the Census 
and as a result about one-third of the census tracts in Tallahassee have more 
than a 20 percent college student population, including the downtown areas.  In a 
typical city not dominated by a university the student population in most census 
tracts would be about 12 percent or fewer (and would include students of all 
ages).  Therefore bus access results for Tallahassee would be highly skewed.  
Based on these criteria, about 16 cities remain from the original list of 490.  
Of the 16, four are selected, two each with a comparable form of government for 
the two-tailed case study design as discussed above. Table 2 shows the cities 
that meet these criteria. 
       
Table 2:  Cities with Bus Service Selected for Study 
 Mobile AL Richmond VA Asheville NC Charlotte NC 
Population 194,091 198,869 74,897 649,578 
Percent African-
American 
48.5% 52.3% 14.7% 33.7% 
Percent Hispanic 1.6% 4.2% 4.2% 10% 
Unemployment 7.6% 10.6% 5.6% 7.7% 
Total Housing 
Units/Units per 
Capita 
89,020/0.46 93,730/0.47 38,101/0.51 296,465/0.46 
Mean travel time 
to work (minutes) 
21.1 20.8 17.6 24.1 
Median HHI 35,239 37,442 37,996 51,050 
Percent of families 
below poverty 
18.7% 16.2% 11.5% 9.3% 
Unlinked 
passenger trips – 
(rank) 
855 thousand 
(296
th
) 
13.4 million 
(58
th
) 
1.1 million 
(262
nd
) 
20.4 million 
(46
th
) 
 
 
Form of Gov’t. Mayor-council Mayor-council Council-manager Council-manager 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 Mobile AL Richmond VA Asheville NC Charlotte NC 
Number of 
Routes/Total 
Route Miles 
11/377 31/658 24/391 47/1000 
 
Index of Ethnic 
Dissimilarity
16
 
63.3 68.3 56.4 61.1 
Number of Census 
Tracts 
84 64 30 127 
Land Area in Sq. 
Miles/Pop. Per 
Square Mile 
117.9/1686.9 60.1/3292.7 40.9/1685.9 242.3/2681.2 
Source:  2005-2007 Census Bureau American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates 
  
 The subgroup of mayor-council cities is composed of Mobile, AL and 
Richmond, VA.   With the exception of size of the bus system and population 
density, these cities are quite similar.  The subgroup of council-manager cities 
consists of Asheville, NC and Charlotte, NC.  Charlotte is larger in population and 
land area and more affluent than the other cities, yet the size of its bus system is 
comparable to Richmond.  In 2008, the Charlotte Area Transit System opened a 
light rail line, which would disqualify the City from consideration in the sample.  
To maintain comparability, I used bus system data from 2006.    
Dependent Variable 
 Given the unit of analysis and the cities selected for analysis, the next step 
is to define the concept of bus service in order to measure how resources are 
distributed among different routes and neighborhoods.  The challenge is to 
conceptualize service in a way that can be measured.  Past studies on service 
delivery have conceptualized service in different ways.  One commonly used 
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 Source:  www.Censusscope.org. 
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measure examines service expenditures (Cingranelli, 1981), (Bolotin & 
Cingranelli, 1983), (Boyle & Jacobs, 1982), (Mladenka, 1989).  The advantage of 
measuring service by expenditures is that data are often readily available and 
easily understood.  The primary disadvantage is that expenditures do not 
measure service benefits or outcomes – in other words just because more 
money is spent in one neighborhood than another does not mean that 
neighborhood will have better services.  Other confounding reasons such as 
differences in costs and needs impact the level of expenditures as well.   
Mladenka (1989) summarizes this point well by stating that “money is a 
significant indicator of governmental effort and intent” but to assume that “low 
expenditure level represents evidence of government neglect would be 
misleading” (p. 570).  
 Recognizing the complexities of conceptualizing and measuring service, 
Lineberry and Welch (1974) give a lengthy and convincing discussion of the 
importance of outcomes as service measures.  In one of the first theoretical 
pieces on service delivery within political science literature, Lineberry and Welch 
outline challenges with trying to empirically measure government service output.  
Since public goods cannot be measured in physical or monetary terms like 
private goods, the authors argue that the next best way to measure the output of 
a public agency is “the contribution of its service activities (resource inputs) to its 
objectives(s), or in other words, in terms of the effect of its service activities on 
selected community conditions” (p. 704).  Direct measures of output such as fire-
loss rates and achievement test scores are inappropriate measures of output 
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because other variables impact community conditions such as density, ethnicity, 
and income.  In other words, neighborhood security is a function of more than 
just police protection.  What are needed instead are proxy measures that 
correlate with service delivery quality.    
 Lineberry and Welch then suggest 80 such measures that are divided into 
six categories: indicators of input quantity relative to potential demand (e.g., per 
capita police, street lights per miles of street); indicators of input quantity relative 
to expressed demand (e.g., police per reported crimes, bus seats per 
passengers); indicators of input quality (e.g., cleanliness of swimming pools); 
indicators of service delivery quality from the consumer’s perspective (e.g., 
frequency of bus service, proximity of service facilities); indicators of community 
service facility condition (e.g., smoothness of streets); and indicators of 
community conditions (e.g., crime rates).  Of these, the authors argue that 
indicators of service delivery quality from the consumer’s perspective are the 
most appropriate measures because they “are direct functions of service agency 
activity and decision-making” (p. 708).  The key to this point is agency decision-
making, which is at the core of the theory on urban service delivery.  
Furthermore, these proxies view service from the standpoint of the consumer, 
which is ultimately the most important aspect of who gets what and satisfaction 
with public services.    
 Similar to Lineberry and Welch’s notion of measuring service by its impact 
on community conditions, Levy et al. (1974) argue for the use of outcomes as 
service measures.  They state that when evaluating service distribution, it is 
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important to distinguish between government outputs (new swings at the park, or 
new paint at the public memorial) and outcomes, which are the “so-what” of 
politics, or the “judgments by which citizens evaluate their government” (p. 1).  
Like Lineberry and Welch, they focus their analysis on “citizen-consumers” of 
government goods.  To apply their concept of service in the study of Oakland 
schools, streets, and libraries, Levy et al. collect various output measures such 
as per-pupil expenditures, miles of street construction, and books ordered.  They 
then evaluate the outputs based on how they affect different groups of citizens.  
To evaluate outcomes they ask questions such as “should rich and poor be 
treated alike in per-pupil expenditures?” and “should each library purchase the 
same number of books?”  Thus rather than using direct outcome measures such 
as those suggested by Lineberry and Welch they use output measures in 
comparative evaluation to address outcomes.    
 A competing approach for measuring service is offered in the same year 
by Jones and Kaufman (1974).  The authors distinguish between  “effort 
expended by a public authority” and the “desired goal state” that the effort is 
supposed to achieve (p. 339).  In direct contradiction to Lineberry and Welch, 
they argue that effort is the valid measure of service levels because the desired 
goal state, or outcome, is a function of neighborhood conditions in addition to 
effort expended.  Because of these varied neighborhood conditions, outcomes 
are not comparable.  Interestingly, Jones and Kaufman use the same logical 
argument on the confounding effect of neighborhood conditions that Lineberry 
and Welch use to distinguish between outputs and outcomes.  Yet Jones and 
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Kaufman come to a different conclusion.  To illustrate their argument they use an 
example from the private sector: “The services of a medical doctor…are not the 
sole or even a major determinant of a patient’s health…”  In other words, 
“services rendered are seldom determinative of the desired goal state” (p. 340).  
Using this logic, Jones and Kaufman argue that effort or the “quality and quantity 
of the staff and equipment” used to produce a service is the appropriate measure 
of service.  By contrast, Lineberry and Welch would classify these measures as 
indicators of input quantity and quality.   
 Table 3 summarizes the various measures of public services discussed 
above.   
 
 
Table 3: Measures of Public Services  
Approach Authors Examples 
Expenditures Cingranelli, Boyle & Jacobs, 
Bolotin & Cingranelli, Koehler 
& Wrightson 
Police expenditures per 
neighborhood 
Effort (Inputs) Jones & Kaufman Garbage routes/1000 persons 
Outputs Levy et al. Miles of repaved street 
Outcomes Lineberry & Welch, 
Mladendka & Hill, Antunes & 
Plumlee, Talen 
Proximity of service facilities 
 
 
Of these different approaches in Table 3, this study will follow the 
Lineberry and Welch conceptualization of service measured by outcome.  If the 
ultimate question of service delivery research is who gets what, or who gets the 
benefits of government activities, or who “wins and loses” with regard to the 
public Santa Claus, it is clear that considering distribution from the perspective of 
the beneficiaries is the most valid indicator of service.  A public agency may 
believe that their police patrols are equitable based on certain formulas, needs, 
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or mandates, but if residents do not believe they have adequate police protection 
then something is amiss.  In other words, effort does not tell the entire story.  
Levy et al. summarize this point well: 
Consider government as a mechanism that makes decisions about what it 
should do.  The decisions result in the production of outputs.  Officials 
dispense these outputs to citizens in such a way that we talk about 
distribution of outputs or discern a pattern of resource allocation.  When 
anyone evaluates this distribution or pattern, we refer to outcomes.  To 
inquire about the impact of an outcome is to ask how the lives of individual 
citizens are altered by governmental action in the future (p. 2).  
 
The use of outcomes as a measure of public service is validated by other 
scholars in urban service delivery and appears to be the most widely accepted 
measure.  For example, Rich (1979) argues that outcomes should be the focus of 
inquiry because they measure the effectiveness of services in meeting the needs 
of different groups rather than just what local government did for different groups.  
Burnett (1981) states that concerning who gets what, outputs, or the actions of 
public authorities, tell only part of the story whereas outcomes indicate the 
consequences of outputs on the people affected by them.  Pacione (1990) 
agrees and states that while outputs are the products of public agency activities, 
outcomes are the “changes in relevant social conditions brought about by a 
service” (p. 61).  These authors emphasize the importance of measuring the 
impact of service on quality of life, which is consistent with the Lineberry concept 
of service from consumers’ perspective.    
Measuring Bus Service 
Using the Lineberry and Welch (1974) classification as guide for 
conceptualizing service, the next step is to determine a specific measure of bus 
service.  In the public transportation literature, the concept of service is typically 
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understood as access (Kittelson et al., 2003b, Murray et al., 1998).  For example, 
having bus service in a neighborhood means residents are able to board a bus 
somewhere fairly close to their residence, typically within walking distance.  Bus 
access is a broad concept that could be measured with multiple variables 
including the number of bus stops in each neighborhood, the number of routes, 
frequency of service, access to key destinations (downtown, medical, shopping), 
transfer times, and proximity to bus stops.  These variables measure different 
aspects of access.  The number of bus stops measures relative availability of 
access whereas frequency measures the relative convenience of access.  
Equality in the number of bus stops in each tract does not necessarily mean that 
service is as frequent in each tract.  Likewise, frequency of service does not 
necessarily mean that the routes take people to major service areas without 
multiple transfers.  Ultimately a variable that captures all aspects of access, 
including service quality, would be useful for this analysis. 
The question, then, is how to operationalize the concept of access in a 
way that considers the multiple aspects of access.  The first and most commonly 
used measure in the urban service delivery literature is called a container 
measure of access, which is simply a count of the number of facilities or services 
contained within a given geographical area (Talen & Anselin, 1998).  Lineberry 
(1975), and Mladenka (1978) primarily used container measures in their studies 
and calculated, for example, average distance from each census tract to the 
nearest park or library.  The advantage of a container access measure is each of 
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calculation; however, they are useful only for measuring access to fixed facilities 
such as bus stops.      
More sophisticated measures of accessibility are used in modeling 
analysis and capture “the spatial distribution of potential destinations, the ease of 
reaching each destination, and the magnitude, quality, and character of the 
activities found there” (Handy & Niemeier, 1997, p. 1175).  These measures have 
typically been used to model urban transportation planning and travel demand.  
These measures include cumulative opportunity measures, which count the 
number of travel “opportunities” or destinations reached within a given distance, 
gravity-based measures, which weigh the travel opportunities by an impedance 
function (i.e., travel time or cost), and utility-based measures, which measure the 
utility a consumer gets from one travel choice relative to all others.17  
As noted above, cumulative opportunity, gravity, and utility-based access 
measures are typically used to model travel planning because they indicate “the 
inherent characteristic (or advantage) of a place with respect to overcoming 
some form of spatially operating source of friction” (Dalvi & Martin, 1976, p. 18).  
Sources of friction include cost, distance, time, and convenience.  In other words 
these measures indicate the relative ease of reaching a certain destination such 
as a workplace or medical facility.  In the public transportation context, model-
based measures of access would be appropriate for measuring bus service in a 
comparative sense in terms of the ease of reaching a given destination by bus 
versus another form of transportation.  Yet this study is more concerned with the 
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 For a comprehensive overview of these access measures see Morris, Dumble, and Wigan 
(1978). 
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quantity and quality of access on a neighborhood basis than with comparative, 
destination-based access.  Additionally, these measures are based on fairly data-
intensive calculations that require a list of all relevant origins and destinations 
within a certain travel zone, travel cost or time cost from each origin to each 
opportunity, and, for utility-based measures, a function that captures the 
attractiveness of a destination.  In many cases, gathering these data involves 
travel surveys collected from individual households within the travel zone of 
interest (Handy & Niemeier, 1997).  
A less data-intensive alternative to opportunity, gravity, and utility-based 
measures of access is a geographic information systems- (GIS) based analysis 
of access.  GIS is a computer-based tool that analyzes and displays geographic 
information based on locational characteristics, which according to Nyerges 
(1995)  is highly relevant to the study of transportation because transportation is 
explicitly concerned with spatial relationships.  For example, GIS allows analysis 
of spatial relationships of such variables as street networks, neighborhood 
boundaries, bus stops, and major employment centers as well as economic, 
social, and environmental conditions within a particular area.  Understanding 
these relationships allows transportation planners to draw conclusions about both 
technical planning issues such as bus route location and policy-related questions 
such as whether certain destinations are accessible by public transportation.   
Thill (2000) extends Nyerges’ piece and notes that GIS is well-suited for 
transportation analysis because of the multi-disciplinary context in which 
transportation analysis is conducted.  Transportation planners must consider not 
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only transit and highway networks but the “natural, social, and economic 
systems” that integrate with transportation networks (p. 4).  GIS allows for this 
integration by visually modeling relationships among data from unrelated 
sources, such as transit routes, neighborhoods, and neighborhood 
characteristics.  This integration is key for the analysis of bus service access 
because the focus of this study is bus availability as it relates to the socio-
economic conditions of neighborhoods.     
Grengs’ (2001) study on grocery stores in Syracuse, New York is a good 
example of this integration.  Grengs devises an indicator of accessibility to transit 
for what he calls “vulnerable” households, or households that do not have access 
to a car.  By mapping those households using GIS with the transit network as 
well as the location of local grocery stores, he is able to analyze access to 
grocery stores by vulnerable households.  Grengs’ technique is similar to the 
“equity maps” used by Talen in the study mentioned above on park access in 
Pueblo and Macon.  Another example of a GIS-based access measure 
developed in the U.K. is a public transit accessibility level (PTAL) index, which 
measures accessibility from a point of origin to a transit network based on 
walking time and availability of transit.  PTALs are then displayed on a map of a 
particular transit network allowing visualization of access by area (Wu & Hine, 
2003).      
Although GIS-based analysis is highly effective in transportation analysis, 
a third approach for measuring access that incorporates spatial as well as other 
elements of access is drawn from research on public transportation performance 
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measures.  Traditional measures of transit performance, such as those collected 
by the National Transit Database, focus on efficiency from the transit agency’s 
perspective.  These measures are traditionally used in a business environment 
and include such things as cost efficiency (total vehicle miles per operating 
expense), labor efficiency (revenue hours per employee), and vehicle efficiency 
(high passenger loadings per vehicle miles) (Perry & Babitsky, 1986).   In 
contrast to these traditional measures of efficiency, the Transportation Research 
Board (TRB) has spearheaded research on performance measures that are 
customer-oriented.  The TRB argues that while traditional efficiency measures 
are important to transit agencies and funding bodies, the public also has an 
interest in how well transit is performing and whether “transit provides a valuable 
service for them, for someone they know, or for the community as a whole” 
(Kittelson et al., 2003b, p. 4).   
Specifically, TRB-sponsored research argues that customer satisfaction of 
public transit is important to several different categories of users including typical 
riders, welfare-to-work clients, employers, the community, and transit agencies.   
Typical riders will be more likely to use transit again if they have a pleasant 
experience and if the service is convenient.  For welfare-to-work clients, transit 
availability may be the difference between being able to find work and not.  
Likewise for employers whose workers either do not have a car or who find public 
transportation more convenient, transit availability can improve productivity.  For 
the community, customers who like using transit may increase ridership and ease 
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funding constraints.  Finally, for transit agencies higher levels of customer 
ridership increase loyalty and increase demand (Kittelson et al., 2003b). 
Research on customer-oriented performance measures indicates that two 
measures are most important to customers: availability and comfort and 
convenience (Kittelson et al., 2003a).  Availability includes both a spatial element 
(can a rider access the service) and temporal availability (is the service provided 
at convenient times and with sufficient frequency).  Comfort and convenience 
encompasses several elements including safety, travel time, and reliability.  
Selecting a measure that considers availability and comfort and convenience for 
this study accomplishes two things.  First, such a measure would encompass a 
broad definition of access to bus service, which is more desirable than for 
example a simple container measure (e.g., the number of bus stops in a 
neighborhood).  Second, this measure would be consistent with the Lineberry 
and Welch (1974) framework that urges customer-focused measures of outcome.      
Several different measures of spatial access, temporal access, and 
comfort and convenience have been either used or proposed.  A comprehensive 
review of these measures with accompanying calculations is found in both the 
Transit Cooperative Research Program’s Guidebook for Developing a Transit 
Performance-Measurement System (Kittelson et al., 2003b) and in a report by 
the Center for Transportation Research at the University of Texas Austin (Bhat, 
Guo, Sen, & Weston, 2005).  Choosing an appropriate measure of access from 
the choices mentioned in these reports requires finding a measure that covers 
the two main elements of customer satisfaction but that can be calculated with 
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relative ease from readily-available data.  Bhat et al. suggest that one of the 
better composite measures of transit access is the Local Index of Transit 
Availability (LITA), developed by Rood (1998) for the Sacramento-based Local 
Government Commission.  The LITA measures three aspects of service: route 
coverage (spatial availability), frequency (temporal availability), and capacity 
(comfort and convenience).  This measure of access can be calculated with 
readily available data from transit agencies using GIS as a tool to analyze results 
at the census tract level.   
The original intent of the LITA was to provide urban policy makers and 
planners a tool that indicates which parts in a metropolitan area the most transit 
“intense” in order to facilitate transit-oriented development (Rood, 1998).  Put 
differently by the author, “the purpose of LITA is to inform land use and 
transportation decisions, which are often made under assumptions of near-
universal automobile travel without regard to accessibility by alternative modes” 
(p. 3).   Although the LITA is intended for use by city planners, index construction 
(discussed below) as well as the ability to calculate the index at the census tract 
level makes it a suitable measure for examining socio-spatial distribution of bus 
service.   
The index has three parts as shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Local Index of Transit Availability          
Element Definition 
Capacity  (Total daily seats on a bus line) x (route-miles of 
transit line in each census tract)/(total population of 
tract). 
 
Where  
Total daily seats = (vehicles per day on each route) x 
(vehicle capacity) 
Route miles = (length of two-way route completely 
within tract) + (! x length of route bordering tract) 
Total population = (resident population +worker 
population) 
 
Frequency Total daily vehicles in a tract IF the line has at least 
one stop in a tract. 
 
Where  
Totally daily vehicles = (standard + alternate vehicles 
per day) 
 
Service Coverage (Number of bus stops in a tract by route)/(square 
miles of land area in the tract). 
 
Where  
Number of bus stops in a tract = (number of 
intersections with at least one transit stop completely 
within the tract) + (! x number of intersections with at 
least one transit stop bordering the tract) 
 
 
 
For each of the three components, a total is calculated by route in each tract and 
z-scores are calculated for each component.   Finally, the three standardized 
scores are averaged to arrive at an overall LITA score in each tract.   
This dissertation uses a LITA score as the dependent variable.  Although 
the LITA does not consider all aspects of transit access such as safety, 
cleanliness of bus stops, and the like, it is a fairly comprehensive measure in that 
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it incorporates measures for spatial and temporal availability as well as comfort.18  
In addition, the LITA index can be calculated using GIS and spreadsheets for any 
transit system for which bus stop and route data are available in database form. 
For model estimation, LITA is used as the dependent variable as well as the 
three components of LITA – capacity, frequency, and coverage – in order to 
analyze separately these three different aspects of access.  
Independent Variables 
The hypotheses are that neighborhoods defined by transit-dependency, 
whether because they have a high percentage of non-Caucasian residents, low 
income residents, students, elderly, or are lacking political power, receive worse 
access to bus service than others all else equal.  An alternative hypothesis is that 
bus service is distributed according to equitable standard rules and procedures 
that result in random variations in service access across neighborhoods.  The 
operationalization of transit-dependency variables is straightforward.  Data are 
from the 2000 decennial Census of Population and Housing and are simply total 
non-Caucasian population, student population defined as high school, college, 
and graduate, and elderly population defined as residents over age 65 divided by 
the total population in each census tract.19  Income is operationalized as median 
household income in each census tract.   
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 Capacity is a proxy for comfort in that it measures crowding.  Crowding is clearly only one 
aspect of comfort yet data on more refined measures of comfort such as the age of buses, 
cleanliness, and climatization are not readily available by route.  
19
 Census data measures ethnicity in two different ways.  The first is by category such as African- 
American, American Indian, Asian, other, and two or more “races.”  The second way uses the 
same categories but distinguishes between Hispanic and non-Hispanic.  Thus total non-
Caucasian population may be calculated either way.  I calculated both measures and the Pearson 
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Using ethnicity and income as explanatory variables is consistent with 
prior studies on urban service delivery shown in Table 1.  In fact ethnicity and 
income are two of the three primary elements in the underclass hypothesis.  
None of these prior studies, however, properly dealt with the issue of multi-
collinearity between ethnicity and income.  The validity of using these as 
separate independent variables is in many cases problematic.  Data used in this 
study show a Pearson correlation between the percent of non-Caucasian 
residents and household income in a census tract is to be -0.67, which is a 
moderately high correlation but below a generally accepted cutoff point of 0.80.  
This study adds two more variables, student and elderly population, as 
explanatory variables because students and older residents are more likely to be 
transit-dependent.  The APTA (2008a) reports 10.6 percent of transit trips are for 
going to school, which is the second highest reason stated for a transit trip after 
commuting to work.  As well, elderly residents would be more likely to ride transit 
because their car mobility is more limited.     
Standard rules and procedures are more difficult to measure in 
quantitative form.  Prior studies have measured this variable using an indicator of 
need for service based on the assumption that decision rules would typically 
consider need as one of the primary determinants of service delivery.  This 
assumption is reasonable in light of the rational-professional model of 
bureaucracy that dominates metropolitan public entities – if need were not the 
primary driver of service decisions, the bureaucratic process would be suspect.  
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correlation of the two measures is 0.99.  Therefore to calculate percentage non-Caucasian I used 
the simpler approach of adding all the non-Caucasian categories divided by total population.   
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For this study, need is measured by the percent of households in the census 
tract without access to a car.  Presumably if a high percentage of households in a 
tract do not have a car, the need for bus service will be greater and these tracts 
in turn would receive relatively more bus service.  
Control Variables 
 Several factors account for the level of bus service that, while not directly 
related to the transit-dependent hypotheses, should be considered as control 
variables.  These include population density and the percent of residents who 
take public transportation to work.  These variables have a demonstrated 
relationship to public transportation.  First, residents living in densely-populated 
neighborhoods are less likely to have cars and thus more likely to ride transit 
(Salon, 2006).  In addition, high-density areas have closer proximity to transit 
(Polzin & Maggio, 2007).  Second, neighborhoods with a high percentage of 
residents that ride transit to work would be expected to have better access to 
transit.    
 While including a variable that measures the percent of residents that take 
the bus to work has obvious intuitive appeal as a control variable, it is likely not a 
valid measure due to endogeneity.  It could be as stated above that 
neighborhoods with a high percentage of residents that ride the bus to work 
would have better access to transit.  It could also be that more people ride the 
bus to work because they have better access to transit in their neighborhood.   
Determining causality is problematic, yet it is important to keep commuter 
demand for bus transit in the model because commuters represent such a large 
portion of transit users and the presence of commuters in a neighborhood could 
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be a factor in determining need for transit.  In order to retain the factor of 
commuter demand in the model while avoiding endogeneity issue, the variable 
population density is replaced with commuter density, which is defined as the 
percent of workers not working at home divided by total square miles in a census 
tract.  Using this variable keeps population density as a control variable while 
refining density to be more specific and capture the commuter element in transit 
demand.20    
 A list of all variables used in the study is shown in Table 5. 
 
  
Table 5: Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable  Data Source Measurement  
LITA Calculated from bus route and 
stop information 
Bus service access 
LITA – Capacity Calculated from bus route and 
stop information 
Comfort 
LITA – Frequency Calculated from bus route and 
stop information 
Temporal access 
LITA – Coverage Calculated from bus route and 
stop information 
Spatial access 
Percent minority Census Transit-dependency  
Household Income Census Transit-dependency 
Percent of residents that are 
students 
Census Transit-dependency 
Percent of residents that are 
elderly (over 65)  
Census Transit-dependency 
Percent of households with no 
car 
Census Need for bus service 
Commuter density Census Control 
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 The literature on transit service planning indicates that population density, along with the 
physical characteristics of a neighborhood, are key elements considered by transit planners when 
designing bus routes.  See for example Benn (1995). 
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The toll good aspect of public transportation raises a measurement issue 
with the transit-dependent variable.  As noted by Miranda and Tunyavong (1994), 
because toll goods rely on user fees, “inequality would depend largely on the 
ability to pay” (p. 514).  Thus in poorer neighborhoods where people may not be 
able to afford to ride the bus, there may be fewer bus stops not because of 
discrimination but because fewer people demand bus service.  In this case, 
income would be measuring need in addition to economic status.  However, this 
effect is mitigated by the fact that more people in poor neighborhoods are car-
less and thus dependent on transit no matter what the cost (Grengs, 2001).  In 
addition, social service agencies often give free bus passes to lower income 
clients to enable them to ride the bus.  Thus measurement bias is limited.  
Further, because the model controls separately for need, economic status and 
need are measured holding other factors constant. 
Statistical Model 
The analytical tool to examine these relationships on bus service is 
determined by the research question and the hypothesized relationships 
explaining bus service distribution.  Figure 2 shows the hypothesized 
relationships. 
 The relationships in Figure 2 suggest a path regression model as the 
appropriate tool for analysis.21  Path analysis is an extension of multiple 
regression where certain variables are both endogenous and exogenous to the 
model.  In other words, a chain of causality is allowed whereby one variable may 
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 For a discussion of path analysis, see for example Alwin and Hauser (1975).  
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have a direct impact on the dependent variable and may also act indirectly 
through another variable as a mediator on the dependent variable.  Path analysis 
begins with a model showing relationships among variables with arrows indicating 
causality.  Exogenous variables whose causes are not modeled have no arrows 
going toward them.  Exogenous variables may be correlated, which is indicated 
with a line going between them.  Endogenous variables are shown with incoming 
arrows and are either mediating variables with a line coming in and out or 
dependent variables with only an incoming arrow.  A model with one dependent 
variable is conventionally termed the final endogenous variable.  In path analysis, 
successive equations are estimated for each endogenous variable using ordinary 
least squares.22  The assumptions for OLS regression also extend to path 
regression.  Estimation results are called path coefficients, which are standardized 
regression coefficients.  Each equation has a disturbance term that is 
conventionally represented as unexplained variance e, or 1-R2.  Once successive 
equations are estimated, the resulting path model is shown with arrows drawn 
only for coefficients that are statistically significant.          
 Path coefficients are used to decompose the model into direct, indirect, 
and unanalyzed effects.  Direct effects are paths with no mediating variables on 
the final endogenous variable.  Indirect effects are those transmitted through 
mediating endogenous variables.  The value of an indirect path is the product of 
path coefficients leading to the dependent variable.  Total effect is the sum of 
direct and indirect values.  Unanalyzed effect is the Pearson correlation of 
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 Maximum likelihood estimation may be used as well. 
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exogenous variables, which is not included in the total effect but sometimes 
included in presentation of results for the sake of completeness.         
 In the model of bus service distribution, five variables are hypothesized to 
have a direct impact on the level of bus service: commuter density, percent non-
Caucasian residents, percent of households with no car, household income, and 
percent students.  In addition, percent no car and income are endogenous 
variables that may influence bus access through indirect paths.  Finally, the 
percent of elderly residents is hypothesized to impact bus access only indirectly 
because the demand for transit services is primarily a function of carless status. 
Table 6 outlines these relationships. 
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Table 6:  Rationale for Bus Access Relationships in Path Model 
Variable 
(expected direction of 
relationship) 
Direct Relationship Indirect Relationship 
Commuter Density 
(positive) 
Neighborhoods with dense 
populations of commuters 
provide a larger potential 
customer base of transit riders 
than neighborhoods with 
dispersed population 
Influence via carless 
households because people 
living in dense areas are less 
likely to own cars 
Percent Non-Caucasian 
(positive) 
Neighborhoods with a high 
percent of non-Caucasian 
residents are more likely to 
use bus transit  
Impact via carless households 
because non-Caucasians are 
more likely not to own a car  
 
Percent of Households with no 
Car 
(positive) 
Neighborhoods with a high 
percent of carless households 
need access to transit for 
mobility 
NA 
Household Income 
(negative) 
Higher income residents 
choose to use cars 
Impact via carless households 
because higher income 
residents are more likely to 
own cars 
Percent of Residents Elderly 
(positive, negative) 
NA  Positive through carless 
households because the 
elderly are less likely to drive 
and negative through income 
because the elderly tend to 
have higher incomes 
Percent of Residents that are 
Students 
(positive) 
Neighborhoods with a high 
percentage of students may 
have higher demand for bus 
service 
NA 
 
 A path model captures these relationships more accurately than a single-
equation regression model.  With the exception of Lineberry (e.g.,1975) and 
Mladenka (e.g., 1990) whose research used correlation analysis, most studies in 
urban service delivery have used a single-equation regression model to test the 
causality of each hypothesized factor in determining service distribution while 
controlling for other factors.  For example, Bolotin & Cingranelli (1983) use the 
following equation to test the underclass hypothesis for Boston police service: 
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            = ! + "1(Income) + "2(Crime Rate) + "3(Mayoral Support) + "4(% Black) + #        
 
Their equation captures the three elements of the urban underclass – ethnicity, 
class, and political power – and a measure of need (crime rate) to control for 
bureaucratic decision rules.  Yet as noted by Cingranelli (1981) in his study of 
police and fire services in Boston, service delivery is complex whereby some 
variables may intervene with others on the outcome variable.  Cingranelli 
analyzed his data using both single-equation regression and a path model and 
concluded that “path-analytic techniques proved useful in relating isolated 
elements of the alternative explanatory frameworks to one another” (p. 688).  
Thus comparison of direct and indirect effects allows for a more complete 
understanding of the explanations for bus service delivery.  All inferential 
interpretations made in Chapter 8 are based on the 0.05 significance level. 
Qualitative Component 
 As discussed above, the political power aspect of the underclass 
hypothesis is analyzed based on government form of the four cities.  The impact 
of local government politics on bureaucratic decisions is multi-layered including 
interactions between the bureaucracy and mayors, city councils, city managers, 
and neighborhood groups.  Thus measuring political power raises a question of 
internal validity.  Kirk and Miller (1986) argue that a method of measurement has 
theoretical (construct) validity if the observations in a study correspond to the 
theoretical basis for the study.  To ensure that a measure is valid, or in their 
words to ensure that the researcher is “seeing what she thinks she sees,” Kirk 
and Miller argue for diversity in method (p. 30).  Therefore in order to execute a 
Per Capita 
Police 
Expenditure 
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valid and rigorous analysis of the research question, the path regression 
approach is supplemented with two qualitative components – archival research 
and elite interviews.   
 Archival research is used to gather information on the electoral and 
administrative arrangements in each of the four cities as well as legal 
relationships between elected officials and bus systems.  This research is based 
on a review of city charters and organizational charts for city government 
administration, both of which are publicly available via online sources.  
Confidential interviews with a city council member and a member of the planning 
staff for each bus system are used to further understand how government and 
the bureaucracy interact.  The interviews are conducted using a standardized 
open-ended questionnaire instrument, which allows for transparency and ease of 
comparing answers (Patton, 2002).  The interview instrument is included as 
Attachment A.  Due to limitations on travel, the interviews are conducted on the 
phone.  Data from archival and interview research are used to understand the 
extent and impact of politicized decision-making in the four cities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8: RESULTS 
 
  
 Table 7 shows descriptive information for the variables in the model.  
Maps of LITA scores by census tract for each city are show in Figures 4, 5, 6, 
and 7 for each of the four cities under study, respectively.  Frequency 
distributions for the LITA index and its three components are shown in Figure 8. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
LITA – pooled data 0.00 27.71 9.12 4.75 
Asheville 0.00 20.02 9.27 4.36 
Charlotte 6.71 27.71 12.04 3.94 
Mobile 0.00 16.44 4.23 2.31 
Richmond 5.45 21.16 10.57 3.30 
LITA Component 1: 
Capacity – pooled 
data 
0.00 26.08 8.42 4.29 
Asheville 0.00 17.20 8.26 3.59 
Charlotte 6.71 26.08 11.10 3.56 
Mobile 0.00 14.12 4.04 2.16 
Richmond 5.39 19.58 9.73 3.10 
LITA Component 2: 
Coverage – pooled 
data 
0.00 28.42 9.43 5.10 
Asheville 0.00 19.25 9.26 4.43 
Charlotte 6.71 28.42 12.44 4.28 
Mobile 0.00 19.29 4.27 2.53 
Richmond 5.48 23.90 11.22 3.73 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
LITA Component 3: 
Frequency – 
pooled data 
0.00 28.62 9.52 5.04 
Asheville 0.00 23.60 10.29 5.22 
Charlotte 6.71 28.62 12.58 4.23 
Mobile 0.00 15.91 4.37 2.36 
Richmond 5.48 19.99 10.75 3.28 
 
Percent non-
Caucasian (%) – 
pooled data 
0.01 1.00 0.47 0.34 
Asheville 0.01 0.76 0.20 0.20 
Charlotte 0.01 0.99 0.42 0.30 
Mobile 0.03 1.00 0.55 0.34 
Richmond 0.01 1.00 0.61 0.34 
Household Income 
($) – pooled data 
$5,714 $163,284 $39,586 $22,214 
Asheville $14,331 $118,980 $36,381 $18,243 
Charlotte $9,494 $144,058 $49,748 $23,933 
Mobile $5,714 $80,572 $29,876 $14,312 
Richmond $7,635 $163,284 $33,533 $20,821 
Percent of 
households with 
no car (%)
23
 – 
pooled data 
0.00 0.81 0.14 0.13 
Asheville 0.01 0.36 0.11 0.08 
Charlotte 0.00 0.65 0.10 0.12 
Mobile 0.00 0.66 0.13 0.12 
Richmond 0.01 0.81 0.23 0.16 
Commuter density 
(person/mi
2
) – 
pooled data 
17 13,163 1421 1477 
Asheville 58 1,730 645 470 
Charlotte 124 4,705 1,289 777 
Mobile 17 2,913 1,016 583 
Richmond 194 13,163 2,573 2,628 
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 Percent no car and commuter density are transformed by base 10 log in the regression 
analysis to account for outliers and reduce skew in the regression standard residuals. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Percent of 
residents that are 
students (%) – 
pooled data 
0.03 1.00 0.12 0.10 
Asheville 0.07 0.41 0.11 0.06 
Charlotte 0.03 0.85 0.11 0.08 
Mobile 0.05 1.00 0.13 0.11 
Richmond 0.06 0.87 0.14 0.13 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Percent of 
residents that are 
elderly (over 65) 
(%) – pooled data 
0.00 0.30 0.12 0.06 
Asheville 0.10 0.25 0.17 0.04 
Charlotte 0.00 0.26 0.09 0.05 
Mobile 0.00 0.30 0.13 0.06 
Richmond 0.02 0.30 0.14 0.06 
  N=279 
 In estimating the path model, census tracts that contain the central 
business district (CBD) of the city are omitted from analysis.  These tracts (in the 
case of Richmond, the CBD is located in two tracts) contain an abundance of bus 
stops and routes because they are the point of origin and destination for the 
majority of routes.  Thus the level of access is highly skewed and not meaningful 
in the sense of residents’ ability to access bus service.  In addition, bus routes 
that serve only a university or college in a city are omitted from analysis because 
those routes are used only to shuttle students within a university area.  Express 
routes are omitted as well because the LITA calculation does not properly 
distinguish between express and non-express routes.  Express routes arguably 
offer superior access to residents in the neighborhoods where they stop, yet the 
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LITA methodology scores these neighborhoods as having less, not more, access 
because they have fewer stops.  Finally, five observations are eliminated from 
analysis as they are identified by casewise diagnostics as outliers.  
Results with Four Cities Analyzed as Pooled Data 
 The first iteration of analysis is to estimate the statistical model with all 
four cities stacked into one panel of data with LITA as the dependent variable.  A 
dummy variable with a value of 1 for the council-manager cities and 0 for the 
mayor-council cities is included in the pooled analysis to determine whether the 
two groups of cities statistically differ.  This iteration involves three separate 
regression equations according to the path diagram shown in Figure 2.  Results 
of these equations are shown in Figure 3.   
Direct Effects 
 In the regression equation with bus access (LITA) as the dependent 
variable, the model has unexplained variance of 0.42, a moderately strong 
model.  Percent non-Caucasian and percent students are not statistically 
significant ("=0.21 and 0.14, respectively).  The latter is not remarkable – even 
though students are heavy users of transit, households with students are 
probably dispersed within a city (the variable captures high school, college, and 
graduate students) and thereby not likely to impact the demand for transit within 
a particular neighborhood.  The finding on non-Caucasian neighborhoods, 
however, is more noteworthy.  According to the underclass hypothesis, 
neighborhoods with a high percentage of non-Caucasian residents may receive 
poorer service delivery due a bias against these neighborhoods on the part of 
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service delivery decision-makers or their lack of ability to impact local 
government hierarchy and influence elected officials.  The data on bus access 
refute that hypothesis when the four cities of interest are considered as a panel 
of data.   Although the path coefficient is negative, it is not statistically significant 
("=0.21).   
 Concerning the remaining path coefficients that are statistically significant, 
the direction of the relationship to bus access is in the expected direction with the 
exception of household income.  Commuter density (0.30) has a weak positive 
relationship to bus access and the percent of households with no car (0.69) has a 
strong positive relationship to bus access.  These results are not unexpected if 
bus access is distributed based on need.  Because these variables are 
associated with factors that transit planners typically consider in bus system 
design, these findings support the hypothesis that bus service is delivered 
according to standard procedures.  The strength of the coefficient for carless 
households is particularly telling about the relationship between bus access and 
need.   
 By contrast, the coefficient for household income is the most surprising 
result in the panel data.  Income has a weak positive relationship to bus access 
(0.27), suggesting that all things being equal the greater the income of a 
neighborhood the better the bus access.  This finding implies that residents with 
greater means receive better services and confirms at least one aspect of the 
underclass bias hypothesis.  When considered together with the results for 
commuter density and percent no car, direct relationships to bus access 
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corroborate prior literature that found both need and bias present in the 
distribution of public services.     
 Finally the coefficient for the dummy variable that separates the four cities 
into two groups related by government form is significant and positive (0.59).  A 
significant dummy variable indicates that the council-manager cities are 
statistically different than the reference group of mayor-council cities.  Further, 
the positive coefficient indicates that average access in the council-manager 
cities is higher than the mayor-council cities.  Bus access for the two groups 
analyzed separately is discussed in detail below.  
Indirect Effects 
 The two remaining regression equations in the path model have percent of 
households with no car and household income as endogenous variables.  These 
intervening variables function as mediators between the exogenous variables 
and bus access.  Klem (1995) notes that a “variable functions as a mediator if the 
path coefficient is sizeable enough to establish that some of the causal influence 
is indeed traveling on the indirect route” (p. 202).  Results from these regression 
equations indicate that income does not mediate between elderly and bus access 
as hypothesized in Table 6.  And percent no car does mediate between income 
and non-Caucasian and bus access but not commuter density or elderly and bus 
access.  This result is shown in Figure 3 by the path coefficients: the relationship 
between elderly and income is not significant; the relationship between elderly 
and percent no car is not sizeable (0.17); the relationship between commuter 
density and percent no car is not sizeable (0.14).  Total effect of percent elderly 
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is 0.12 and commuter density is 0.10.  The conclusion from these results is that 
elderly and commuter density do not have much bearing on bus access via an 
indirect path even though the results are statistically significant.   
 By contrast, the path coefficients in the equation with percent no car as 
the dependent variable for percent non-Caucasian (0.40) and income (-0.53) are 
sizeable.  These relationships are also in the expected directions.  The greater 
percentage of non-Caucasian residents in a neighborhood means a greater 
percentage of carless households and higher income neighborhoods means 
fewer carless households.   When multiplied by the path coefficient for percent no 
car on bus access (0.69), the indirect relationship of percent non-Caucasian 
(0.28) to bus access is positive and weak and the indirect relationship of income 
(-0.37) to bus access is negative and moderate.  The indirect relationship of 
percent non-Caucasian is interesting because even though the direct effect of 
non-Caucasian residents on bus access is not significant, non-Caucasian 
neighborhoods still have an impact on bus access through an indirect path.  
Moreover, because the relationship is positive, this impact is what would be 
expected if bus access decisions are made based on areas with greater need for 
service.  This same conclusion holds true for the indirect effect of income, though 
the impact is in the opposite direction (less need, less bus access).  In fact the 
strength of the indirect path of income (-0.37) counteracts the positive direct 
impact of income (0.27) on bus access for a total effect of (-0.10).  Thus the 
indirect and direct effects of income on bus access essentially net to zero.   
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Unanalyzed Effects 
 The remaining paths in the bus access model result from the correlation 
between income and minority.  These relationships are not considered from a 
causal perspective because they are the result of a correlation between 
exogenous variables.  The unanalyzed effect of minority is negligible (0.07) and 
the unanalyzed effect of income is weak (-0.18).   
Total Effects  
 Total effects are displayed in Table 8.  Overall, percent no car is the 
overriding explanation for bus access.  This result as well as the total effects for 
commuter density, percent non-Caucasian, income, and percent elderly all 
support the bureaucratic decision-rules hypothesis and refute the hypothesis that 
transit-dependent neighborhoods receive worse bus access.  Yet although the 
total effect of income is negative, the positive direct effect indicates that 
favoritism toward upper-income neighborhoods impacts bus access as well.  
Table 8:  Effect Decomposition for Pooled Data 
Variable Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
Commuter 
Density 
0.30 0.10 0.40 
Percent Non-
Caucasian 
Not sig. 0.28 0.28 
Percent No Car 0.69 NA 0.69 
Income 0.27 -0.37 -0.10 
Percent Elderly NA 0.12 0.12 
Percent 
Student 
Not sig. NA  
City dummy 0.59 NA 0.59 
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Path Regressions of LITA Components  
 The next iteration of analysis is to estimate the path model using each 
component of the LITA index – capacity, coverage, and frequency – as the final 
exogenous variable.  Analysis of each component separately will reveal if 
relationships between the explanatory variables and three aspects of bus access 
are consistent.  The path coefficients from these equations are multiplied by the 
coefficients from the equations with income and percent no car as dependent 
variables to calculate total effects.  As shown in Table 9, total effects for the three 
components are quite similar to the total effects using LITA as the dependent 
variable.  This result indicates strong co-variance among the three components 
of access and the overall index of access.  Pearson correlations between LITA 
and capacity (0.98), coverage (0.99), and frequency (0.98) confirm this co-
variance.  Because the three components and LITA are not distinct, the 
remaining analysis in this study is based on LITA as the final endogenous 
variable. 
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Table 9: Effect Decomposition with LITA Components 
Variable Component Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
Commuter 
Density 
LITA 0.30 0.10 0.40 
 Capacity 0.30 0.10 0.40 
 Coverage 0.32 0.10 0.42 
 Frequency 0.27 0.10 0.37 
Percent Non-
Caucasian 
LITA Not sig. 0.28 0.28 
 Capacity Not sig. 0.28 0.28 
 Coverage Not sig 0.28 0.28 
 Frequency Not sig. 0.28 0.28 
Percent No 
Car 
LITA 0.69 NA 0.69 
 Capacity 0.66 NA 0.66 
 Coverage 0.69 NA 0.69 
 Frequency 0.69 NA 0.69 
Income LITA 0.27 -0.37 -0.10 
 Capacity 0.28 -0.37 -0.09 
 Coverage 0.27 -0.37 -0.10 
 Frequency 0.26 -0.37 -0.11 
Percent 
Elderly 
LITA NA 0.12 0.12 
 Capacity NA 0.12 0.12 
 Coverage NA 0.12 0.12 
 Frequency NA 0.12 0.12 
Percent 
Student 
LITA Not sig. NA  
 Capacity Not sig. NA  
 Coverage Not sig. NA  
 Frequency No sig. NA  
!
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Bus Access Results Analyzed by City Group 
 As discussed in the research design section, the four cities used in this 
study – Richmond, VA, Mobile, AL, Asheville, NC, and Charlotte, NC – are 
divided into two sub-groups for analysis based on a key theoretical distinction.  In 
the model of bus access this distinction is the form of government in the city.  
Richmond and Mobile have mayor-council (non-reformed) governments and 
Asheville and Charlotte have council-manager (reformed) governments.  
Because the dummy variable used in the pooled data path analysis indicates that 
the two reformed cities are statistically different from the non-reformed cities, the 
two groups are investigated separately.24  Path regression results for the pooled 
data and the two groups are shown in Table 10 and discussed below.  
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 Path regression results for the two cities in each group are similar and are not reported separately. 
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Table 10:  Effect Decomposition for City Groups 
Variable City Direct Indirect  Total 
Commuter 
Density 
    
Pooled 0.30 0.10 0.40 
Richmond/Mobile 0.32 0.21 0.53 
 
Charlotte/Asheville 0.21 0.61 0.82 
 
Percent Non-
Caucasian 
    
Pooled Not significant 0.28 0.28 
Richmond/Mobile -0.32 0.51 0.19 
 
Charlotte/Asheville 0.22 0.25 0.47 
 
Percent No 
Car 
    
Pooled 0.69 NA 0.69 
Richmond/Mobile 0.91 NA 0.91 
 
Charlotte/Asheville 0.61 NA 0.61 
 
Income     
Pooled 0.27 -0.37 -0.10 
Richmond/Mobile 0.34 -0.31 0.03 
 
Charlotte/Asheville 0.27 -0.31 -0.04 
 
Percent 
Elderly 
    
Pooled NA 0.12 0.12 
Richmond/Mobile NA 0.10 0.10 
 
Charlotte/Asheville NA 0.19 0.19 
 
Percent 
Student 
    
Pooled Not significant   
Richmond/Mobile 0.13 NA 0.13 
 
Charlotte/Asheville Not significant   
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Richmond & Mobile: Non-Reformed Cities 
 The strength of the primary regression equation is slightly stronger when 
Richmond and Mobile are analyzed together (e=0.42) than when the four cities 
are analyzed together (e=0.40).  Path regression results based on Figure 2 for 
Richmond and Mobile are similar to the pooled data with one key exception – the 
direct relationship between percent non-Caucasian and bus access is significant 
and negative (-0.32), which may indicate discrimination in bus access for non-
Caucasian neighborhoods in these cities.  The indirect effect of ethnicity through 
carless households is in the same direction (positive) as for the pooled data 
(0.28), but the effect is much stronger (0.51), which would indicate the presence 
of both discrimination in access and access based on need.  As in the pooled 
data, the direct effect of income on bus access is positive (0.34), which in 
combination with the direct result for non-Caucasian residents reinforces the 
hypothesis that bus access is not necessarily based on need.  The other 
difference between Richmond and Mobile and the pooled data is that the path 
coefficient for percent student is significant, yet the relationship is very weak 
(0.13).   
Charlotte and Asheville: Reformed Cities 
 Unexplained variance for the primary regression equation when Charlotte 
and Asheville are analyzed together is 0.57, which is lower than for the pooled 
data (e=0.40) and for Richmond and Mobile as a group (e=0.42).  Like Richmond 
and Mobile, path regression results based on Figure 2 for Charlotte and Asheville 
are also similar to the pooled data with the exception of percent non-Caucasian.  
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Yet whereas the direct relationship in Richmond and Mobile indicated bias 
against non-Caucasian neighborhoods, the direct relationship between non-
Caucasian and bus access in Charlotte and Asheville is significant and positive 
(0.22).  This result may indicate that in Charlotte and Asheville bus access is 
driven by need when ethnicity is considered.  Indeed the total effect for percent 
non-Caucasian is much stronger for Charlotte and Asheville (0.47) than 
Richmond and Mobile (0.19).  With Richmond and Mobile, total effect of ethnicity 
is weak because the direct (-0.32) and indirect effects (0.51) of percent non-
Caucasian counteract each other whereas with Charlotte and Asheville the direct 
(0.22) and indirect effects (0.25) reinforce each other. The end result is that the 
hypothesis that bus access is determined by need is reinforced more strongly in 
the reformed cities than in the non-reformed cities.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 
 
 
 As outlined in the research design, the intent of a two-tailed four-city case 
study was to make use of a valid method for testing the political component of 
underclass bias.  The underclass hypothesis states that certain neighborhoods 
may be disadvantaged in service delivery due to underclass status.  Underclass 
status is defined in either ethnic, economic, or political terms.  For this 
dissertation, underclass status is also seen more broadly to include transit-
dependent neighborhoods with a high percentage of students or elderly 
residents.  Ethnic, economic, student, and elderly compositions of neighborhoods 
are easy to measure using census data as was done in the preceding path 
analysis.  Yet the extent of neighborhood political power can be more difficult to 
conceptualize and measure.  Almost every prior study from Table 1 that tested 
the impact of neighborhood political power on service delivery used an 
independent variable measuring either voter turnout or the percent of residents 
that supported the mayor in a recent election.  A critique of this type of 
explanatory variable is that it is not necessarily a valid measure of political power.  
Just because a certain neighborhood voted overwhelmingly for the mayor does 
not mean that this neighborhood will receive favors from the mayor, particularly in 
cities where the mayor has ceremonial rather than executive power.  I argue that 
the opportunity for favoritism or neglect of certain neighborhoods is more a 
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function of the form of local government than voter activism.  As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the mayor-council form of government, which is based on separation 
of powers between the mayor and city council with the mayor as chief executive, 
is more prone to favoritism and neglect than council-manager form, which is 
based on unitary legislative and executive power and professional management.   
 To test the political aspect of the underclass hypothesis, the data on bus 
access are separated into two groups:  two council-manager cities and two 
mayor council cities.  Two cities were selected for each group to increase the 
number of observations.  As discussed in the results, the groups are statistically 
different from each other.  Indeed, results from the two non-reformed cities 
(Richmond and Mobile) seem to confirm the hypothesis that transit-dependent 
neighborhoods, as indicated by income and ethnicity, have inferior access to bus 
service.  By contrast, results from the reformed cities (Asheville and Charlotte) 
indicate that bus access is based on need where ethnicity is concerned.  Yet is 
government form the true basis for distinction between the two cities?  Form of 
government is a key variable in the model of bus access, yet does it have true 
explanatory power?  To get at this question, a more thorough analysis of the 
impact of government form on decision-making is required.   
Municipal Government Statutory and Legal Form 
 Along with a commission form of government, which is rare in the U.S. 
today, mayor-council and council-manager platforms are the two legal-statutory 
types of local government (Frederickson, Wood, & Logan, 2001).  Both of these 
forms resulted from the good government movement in the late 19th century 
when, according to Frederickson et al. (2001), a group of political reformers 
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organized to “rid cities of corrupt political machines” (p. 4).  The group ultimately 
resulted in the creation of the National Civic League (NCL), which outlined a 
“Model City Charter” designed to foster good government.  Good government 
was defined as one that would serve the entire community rather than the 
interests of special groups.  The Model Charter has been revised several times 
with the most recent version published (8th) in 2007.  The first versions of the 
model charter advocated both the mayor-council structure and the council-
manager structure.  Although both forms of government are advocated by the 
NCL, from the early 1900s forward the council-manager form has been promoted 
due to its reliance on professional management and limited mayoral power.  In 
2008, 49% of municipalities use council-manager form of government and 43.5% 
of municipalities use the mayor-council form (International City/County 
Management Association, 2008).25   
 Traditionally, the mayor-council form of government is characterized by an 
elected mayor who holds executive power and an elected council who holds 
legislative power.  Council members are typically elected by voting district and 
focus on constituency services.  Mayors are responsible for day-to-day 
management and governance and may veto decisions taken by the council.  The 
council-manager form is characterized by an elected city council, one of whose 
members is the mayor with ceremonial power, and an appointed city manager 
that holds executive power.   Council members are typically elected at-large and 
set the overall policy guidance that is carried out by the day-to-day management 
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 Data are for municipalities with populations of 2,500 or greater. 
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of the city manager (MacManus, 1999).  Yet as discussed by Frederickson et al. 
(2004), over time the differences between these two forms have evolved and 
each form has adapted characteristics of the other.  As Svara (2001a) points out, 
much of the evolution is attributed to changes in electoral structures rather than 
the actual form of government.  For example, many mayor-council cities have 
adopted at-large elections for city council members or a mix of district and at-
large elections in order to shift focus from constituency services to city-wide 
governance.  Council-manager cities, on the other hand, in a move toward more 
representative governance, have shifted from at-large to district election of city 
council members and direct election of the mayor.   
 In addition to changes in electoral structure, many cities with a mayor as 
executive have moved toward a more professional management structure.  
These mayor-council cities have instituted a Chief Administrative Officer position, 
a nonelected position much like a city manager that reports to the mayor and is 
responsible for management.  Frederickson et al. (2004) deems cities with 
evolved electoral or administrative structures to be “adapted.”     
 A review of the electoral and administrative arrangements in the four cities 
that are the subject of this study indicates that indeed three of the four have 
adapted form of government to a certain degree.  Table 11 below, which is based 
on Frederickson et al. (2004, p. 108), lists the four cities and their structural 
characteristics.  Highlighted cells indicate where the city structure has evolved 
away its traditional statutory form. 
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Table 11: Adapted Cities 
City Asheville Charlotte Richmond Mobile 
Statutory Form Council-manager Council-manager Mayor-council Mayor-council 
Election of mayor Direct Direct Direct Direct 
Council elections At-large Mixture of at-
large and district 
District District 
Mayor acts as 
Chief 
Administrator? 
No No No Yes 
Mayor has veto 
power? 
No Limited Yes Yes 
Mayor is full-
time? 
No No Yes Yes 
Partisan 
elections 
No Yes No No 
         
 
 Both Asheville and Charlotte have adopted direct election of the mayor.   
In fact Frederickson et al. (2004) note that by 1990, over 60 percent of mayors in 
council-manager cities were directly elected.  Frederickson et al. (2004) claim 
that the evolution to a directly-elected mayor resulted from the need for “more 
effective political leadership” (p. 70).  Even if the actual power of the mayor does 
not change with direct election, this type of mayor gives the city a focal point of 
leadership with an important public relations role and informal power to lead a 
policy agenda.  This result appears to be the case in Asheville and Charlotte, 
where the directly-elected mayor retains a part-time role with limited veto powers.  
The City of Charlotte has also adopted a mix of district and at-large election of 
the city council, which Frederickson et al. (2004) claim indicates a desire for 
more constituency-focused leadership. 
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 The City of Richmond, which only recently switched charters from council-
manager to mayor-council in 2005, has adopted a Chief Administrative Officer 
(CAO) appointed by the mayor.  The CAO replaced the city manager that was 
formerly appointed by the city council.  Typically this type of structure is intended 
to bring professional management into executive decision-making that would be 
otherwise in the hands of the mayor. 
 Thus Charlotte, Asheville, and Richmond may be properly characterized 
as adapted cities.  The important point about adaptation with regard to this study 
on bus access is whether the evolution in government form impacts the extent to 
which government form has explanatory power regarding service delivery 
decisions.  Results from path regression indicate that service delivery decisions 
in the two mayor-council cities are based less on professional norms and 
standards than in the two council-manager cities.  Does adaptation of 
government form change this interpretation of results?   A summary of the 
relationship between elected officials and the transit system in each city is 
required to answer this question.   
 The summary is based on archival research including the legal city charter 
and the organizational chart of the bus system.  In addition, I conducted 
confidential elite interviews with a city council member and a member of the 
planning staff of the bus system in each city.   
Asheville 
 Asheville Transit is one division within the City Transportation & 
Engineering Department whose director reports to the City Manager.  The transit 
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division is headed by a general manager with a small staff.  Bus service 
operations are contracted out to a private company (a common practice in transit 
operations) but day-to-day management, planning, and service changes are 
handled by transit service staff.  Service delivery decisions are made using 
standard guidelines and procedures developed by Asheville Transit.  Guidelines 
used to determine route and stop placement include density, physical feasibility, 
and customer input. 
 To gather customer input the City established a Transit Commission 
whose members are appointed by City Council.  City Council also has a liaison to 
the Transit Commission.  In Asheville, the Transit Commission is the primary 
point of contact for citizen concerns about the bus system as well as the primary 
link between City Council and the bus system.  The Commission serves as an 
advisory group for the bus system with no actual power over transit decisions.   
Ultimately the City Manager is accountable for transit system operations.  Thus it 
appears in Asheville that direct election of the mayor has little impact on the 
professional nature of the bus system.   While fiscal matters such as budgeting, 
purchasing, and fee changes are approved by City Council, day-to-day service 
delivery decisions are made by bureaucrats.      
Charlotte 
 Management of transit services in Charlotte is considerably more complex 
than in Asheville.  The Charlotte Area Transit System (CATS) is managed by the 
Public Transit Department within the City that reports to the City Manager.  Bus 
service operations are contracted out to a private company but day-to-day 
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management, planning, and service changes are handled by CATS staff.  
Service delivery decisions are made using standard guidelines and procedures 
developed by CATS that are continually modified over time.  Guidelines used to 
determine route and stop placement include safety, physical feasibility, and 
customer input.    
 The complexity in the CATS bureaucracy is the result of a policy board, 
the Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC), which was established by interlocal 
agreement among the City, Mecklenburg County (the county in which Charlotte 
resides), and the six other towns in Mecklenburg County.  The CATS service 
area extends beyond the City and the MTC gives elected officials from the 
Charlotte area region a voice in long-range transportation planning.  Voting 
members on the MTC include the mayors from Charlotte and six towns in 
Mecklenburg County as well as the Chair of the Board of County Commissioner.  
 Interaction between elected officials and CATS occurs primarily at the 
MTC level rather than at the City Council level.   The MTC sets policy for CATS 
including standard criteria for route changes.  The MTC also gathers input from a 
citizen bus rider committee.  City Council members may provide input regarding 
CATS to the MTC but ultimately service delivery decisions are made by the 
bureaucracy, which is accountable to the MTC.  Because the MTC is comprised 
of elected officials from several municipalities, the opportunity for an elected 
official from Charlotte to sway service delivery decisions is limited.  As in 
Asheville, it appears that direct election of the mayor and a mix of district and at-
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large council elections has little impact on the professional nature of decision-
making. 
Richmond 
 Greater Richmond Transit Company (GRTC) is a nonprofit jointly owned 
by the City of Richmond and Chesterfield County (southeast of the City of 
Richmond).   The six-member Board of Directors is appointed by the City Council 
and the Chesterfield County Commissioners.   The Board hires senior 
management of GRTC, which is contracted out to a private company.   With this 
management structure, GRTC is not purely a city bus system in that GRTC 
employees are not City employees.  Yet the primary service area of GRTC is 
within the City limits and GRTC is accountable to the Land Use Committee of the 
Richmond City Council.  Service delivery decisions are made by GRTC staff 
based on standard considerations such as safety, usage, land use, and location 
of existing routes and stops.   
 Interaction between GRTC and City Council begins with the Land Use 
Committee.  The mayor may lobby at the Land Use Committee but has no 
specific power to influence its decisions.  Citizen input is also funneled through 
the Land Use Committee, where service changes are vetted prior to being 
reviewed by the City Council.  The City Council, in turn, by City ordinance has 
veto power over decisions taken by GRTC regarding changes in routes.   Thus 
ultimately route decisions are made by politicians and not the bureaucracy.  The 
presence of the Chief Administrative Officer reporting to the mayor does not 
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impact the political nature of decision-making with regard to the bus system 
routes.  
Mobile 
 Wave Transit is owned by the City of Mobile, which contracts with a 
private company for management and operations.  The General Manager of 
Wave Transit works with the City Director of Public Services to coordinate 
infrastructure changes that are needed to accommodate bus operations.  The 
Mobile City Council approves the budget for Wave Transit but service changes 
and operations are managed by the private bureaucracy and do not require 
approval from the City Council.       
 Over ten years ago, the city bus system in Mobile was operated by a 
public authority, whose mismanagement of the system drove it into receivership.  
The City took over the bus system and decided to contract management and 
operations to a private company in order to bring stability to the system and also 
to keep politics out of system operations.  Citizen complaints are funneled 
through the Council to Wave Transit and service changes are made 
independently of the Council.  Thus in Mobile, bus decisions are professional 
even though the form of government does not operate with a professional 
management structure.        
 In summary, the fact that three of the four cities have characteristics of 
adapted electoral and administrative government form does not impact the 
manner in which bus service delivery decisions are made.  The move toward 
more representative government in the council-manager cities of Asheville and 
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Charlotte does not appear to politicize the otherwise professional bureaucracy of 
the transit agencies.  Likewise, the role of the professional Chief Administrative 
Officer does not impact the political nature of bus service decisions in Richmond.  
In Mobile, which is not an adapted city, service decisions are not related to 
government form due to privatization of management.  Overall, government form 
is relevant to bus service delivery decisions in three of the four cities. 
 Does government form, then, explain the differences in results of bus 
access between the two groups of cities?  Clearly in Richmond the bus service 
decision-making is more politicized than in Asheville or Charlotte.  The 
opportunity for favoritism or neglect of certain neighborhoods is more likely in a 
climate of politicized decision-making.  For example, within the last year GRTC 
recommended the elimination of certain routes in Richmond that were inefficient 
and losing money.  Yet the City Council has refused to take up the 
recommendation for fear of political retribution.  As it stands today, the issue with 
these routes is ongoing.   However in Mobile decision-making is not politicized in 
spite of the city government structure.   
 Although service delivery decision-making is different between the two 
groups of cities, we cannot reliably assume causality between government 
structure and bus access in general.  In fact, politicization could work in favor of 
minority neighborhoods just as much as it could work against them.  Indeed the 
structure of municipal government in Richmond and Mobile would presumably be 
more favorable to minority neighborhoods due to the history of council elections 
in these cities.  Both cities were the subject of voting rights lawsuits before the 
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United States Supreme Court in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  These lawsuits 
resulted in a change from at-large council elections to district council-elections as 
a way to increase minority representation in elected office.  In Bolden v. City of 
Mobile, a district court found that at-large elections in Mobile’s then commission 
form of government diluted the black vote and thereby were discriminatory in 
effect.  Although the Supreme Court overturned the decision and ruled that there 
must be discriminatory intent, retrial in the lower court found sufficient evidence 
of discriminatory intent to exclude minorities from public office. A subsequent 
referendum put a mayor-council structure in place with district-based council 
elections (McCrary, Gray, Still, & Perry, 1994).26  In City of Richmond v. United 
States, the Supreme Court found that Richmond’s annexation of a neighboring 
community was intentionally designed to dilute the black vote in the City.  
Richmond at the time had a council-manager form and the court ruling led to the 
abolition of at-large city council elections in favor of district elections (Moeser & 
Silver, 1994).  Thus in both Mobile and Richmond (and in several other Southern 
cities as well), district elections for city council were a legal remedy to increase 
black political representation.  Based on these facts, a fair assumption would be 
that an increase in black political representation would be associated with better 
municipal services in black neighborhoods as well.  For bus service in 2009 in 
Richmond and Mobile, this assumption does not hold true. 
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 The Bolden case was a landmark in the history of the Voting Rights Act in that the Court 
established a new standard of proof for discrimination in election practices.  Strong reaction 
against the ruling from civil rights leaders and public officials resulted in a Congressional 
amendment to the Act (The Bolden Amendment) that clarified that “Congress intended that the 
courts outlaw election practices that were discriminatory in effect, without requiring proof of 
invidious racial purpose (McCrary et al, p.52).  
!
!
)")!
 Perhaps a legacy of poor services in minority neighborhoods carries forth 
in 2009.  In Bolden v. City of Mobile, the lower court judge found not only that the 
at-large system was being used for discriminatory intent and also that “the city 
government was unresponsive to the black community in the delivery of 
municipal services” (McCrary et al, p. 51).  This finding is similar to Hawkins v. 
Town of Shaw – the lawsuit that spurred the body of research on urban service 
delivery – and many others like it of that era.  Although inferior municipal services 
in Richmond are not documented in the urban service delivery literature, it is safe 
to assume that as a highly segregated town operated by “dominance of the white 
aristocracy“ (Moeser & Silver, p. 527) in the 1960s and 1970s that a similar 
dynamic was going on with municipal services.  Overall, the finding that bus 
access is positively related to income and negatively related to minority status in 
Richmond and Mobile is likely the result of many factors including a history of 
discrimination in the provision of municipal services combined with inertia and 
incremental change (Boyne & Powell, 1991). 
      
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
 In conclusion, results of the four-city case study of bus access confirm 
findings from prior research on urban service delivery that both professional 
norms and underclass bias are present in service delivery decisions.  As well, 
government form may impact the extent to which public bureaucracies are 
subject to external pressure from the political arena.  In Charlotte and Asheville, 
with the exception of lower-income neighborhoods, transit-dependent 
neighborhoods do receive better bus access, which is likely due to a professional 
bureaucracy.  In Richmond and Mobile, transit-dependent neighborhoods defined 
by ethnicity and income receive worse access than other neighborhoods, which 
may be a function of politicized decision-making in Richmond but which is not 
related to city government structure in Mobile. 
Opportunities for Future Research  
 One opportunity for further research raised in this study is 
operationalization of the dependent variable.  As discussed in the design section, 
bus access is a multi-faceted variable.  The LITA encompasses three key 
components of access – frequency, capacity, coverage – but does not include 
other aspects that may be important to bus riders.  These other aspects include 
safety, cleanliness, timeliness, availability of shelters and benches at bus stops, 
number of transfers required to reach a destination, and topographical as well as 
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physical barriers to bus stop access.  In fact casual discussions with individual 
bus riders in various cities lead me to believe that these other factors often 
determine whether or not someone will choose to ride the city bus.  However, the 
ability to collect data on these other factors in a timely manner is challenging.  
Many transit agencies collect data on safety violations and timeliness but not in a 
standardized format.  Likewise many agencies have information on the location 
of shelters and benches yet compiling this information in each census tract would 
be time consuming.  Calculating the number of transfers from certain origins to 
certain destinations would be time consuming as would noting all the 
topographical and physical barriers to bus stops.  Yet all of these endeavors 
would be worthwhile for further research.  In addition, bus rider surveys would be 
a valid way to triangulate which aspects of bus service are the most valued by 
riders.   
 A second opportunity for further investigation is the level of resolution in 
the unit of analysis.  Census tract is a logical unit for the reasons discussed in the 
methodology section; however, certain census tracts may encompass several 
miles of land area that may result in overestimation of bus access for a particular 
tract.  For example, a census tract may have multiple bus routes and stops but if 
they are all located in one section of the tract that is not walking distance from all 
parts of the tract, the LITA score for that tract may be skewed.  Census blocks, 
block groups, or traffic analysis zones, which encompass smaller geographic 
areas than census tracts, may be more suitable units of analysis.  Yet data 
availability for these smaller units is problematic.  Devising a procedure to 
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overlay data from the tract level onto smaller geographic units may be a 
promising approach for using a different unit of analysis.    
 Data availability raises a third area for future research.  In this study there 
is a nine-year mismatch between the dependent and independent variables 
because the independent variables are from Census 2000 whereas the LITA is 
calculated with data from 2009.  The only exception is Charlotte, where the LITA 
was calculated from 2006 data so as to pre-date introduction of light rail in the 
City.  Bus stop and route date from 2000 were not available in each city; 
therefore, the second best option was to use the data that were available.  The 
American Community Survey of the Census Bureau provides updates to Census 
2000 data in between the decennial census years, but these data are not 
available at the census tract level.  Re-doing the study when results of the 2010 
Census become available and concurrent with new stop and route data would be 
ideal to capture any changes in neighborhood composition that occur between 
decennial census data.       
 Finally, expanding the research to include an examination of the 
relationship between local funding for transit and the level of access on an intra-
city basis would add to the understanding of comparative levels of access.  For 
example, some municipalities such as Charlotte, NC have implemented an 
incremental sales tax dedicated to transit funding whereas other cities may be 
more dependent on federal funding.  Analysis of local funding arrangements, 
which may be an indication of transit preference by local residents, might impact 
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whether the city has resources to fund adequate mobility in transit-dependent 
neighborhoods.      
Design Issues 
 A limitation with the research design is the case study approach.  As 
discussed above, a random sample of neighborhoods would be a preferable 
method of comparing service delivery.  The results of city studies are not directly 
generalizable to comparable cities.  The results are what Yin (2003) calls 
“analytic” rather than statistical generalization.  In fact all studies on urban 
service delivery suffer from this limitation.  Yet from a public policy perspective, 
results that confirm or disprove the hypothesis on bus service may be interesting 
to transit agencies in general and may prompt further research into specific cities 
and bus systems. 
 Further, the research design is limited in that it does not consider bus 
systems that are owned by special purpose governments or public authorities.  
This design approach is due to theoretical reasons.  Because the body of 
literature on urban service delivery does not consider the impact of public 
authorities, it is important to research bus service from a similar perspective.  Yet 
unlike police and fire protection and parks and libraries, public transportation is a 
public good that is often provided by public authorities.  Further research should 
develop a theory and empirically test urban service delivery on a neighborhood 
basis from a public authority perspective and compare these results with the 
results for city bus systems.  
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Figure 4 
LITA Values and Bus Routes for Asheville, NC 
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Figure 5 
LITA Values and Bus Routes for Charlotte, NC 
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Figure 6 
LITA Values and Bus Routes for Mobile, AL 
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Figure 7 
LITA Values and Bus Routes for Richmond City 
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Figure 8: Frequency Distributions for LITA and Components 
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONS FOR BUS PLANNERS AND ELECTED OFFICIALS 
AND CONFIDENTIALITY FORM 
 
Questions for professional bus route planners:  
1) Will you describe the process used for determining bus routes and stops 
in the [City of Asheville]? 
2) What factors are taken into account when determining new routes or 
changes in routes? 
3) Are these factors established by rules/standard operating procedures or 
are they more informal? 
4) Under what conditions would [Asheville Transit] deviate from using these 
factors in setting service? 
5) To what degree do relevant stakeholders outside of [Asheville Transit] 
(e.g., citizens, community groups, elected officials) have input to the 
determination of new routes?  Please elaborate. 
6) Are recommendations of this department ever over-ruled by senior 
[Asheville Transit] officials?  If so, can you give an example of when this 
has occurred? 
 
 Questions for Elected Officials 
1) What is the nature of your involvement with the bus planning and/or 
operations division? 
2) To what extent does the City Council interact with [Asheville Transit]? 
3) What are the other avenues for interaction between the City Council and 
[Asheville Transit]? 
4) Would you describe the procedure used by the City Council to gather input 
from citizens on satisfaction with the bus system? 
5) How is citizen input channeled from the City Council to[Asheville Transit]?  
6) Would you describe the interaction of the City Council and [Asheville 
Transit] as a politicized process?  If so, how?  If not, why not? 
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Statement of Confidentiality & Consent 
Bus Service Study 
 
 
I understand that this interview is voluntary and that I may discontinue 
participation at any time.  I understand that this interview is for academic 
research only and my name or institutional affiliation will not appear on any of the 
analysis, transcriptions, reports, or other data shared with people associated with 
this project.  In addition, no data bearing my name or institutional affiliation will be 
shared with persons outside the project.    
 
 
 
Signature of Study Participant  Date 
 
 
Signature of Researcher   Date 
 
 
 
